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THE MYTH OF THE DOUBLE-EDGED 
SWORD: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF 
NEUROSCIENCE EVIDENCE IN  
CRIMINAL CASES 
DEBORAH W. DENNO* 
Abstract: This Article presents the results of my unique study of 800 criminal 
cases addressing neuroscience evidence over the past two decades (1992–
2012). Many legal scholars have theorized about the impact of neuroscience 
evidence on the criminal law, but this is the first empirical study of its kind to 
systematically investigate how courts assess the mitigating and aggravating 
strength of such evidence. My analysis reveals that neuroscience evidence is 
usually offered to mitigate punishments in the way that traditional criminal 
law has always allowed, especially in the penalty phase of death penalty trials. 
This finding controverts the popular image of neuroscience evidence as a 
double-edged sword—one that will either get defendants off the hook alto-
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gether or unfairly brand them as posing a future danger to society. To the con-
trary, my study indicates that neuroscience evidence is typically introduced for 
a well-established legal purpose—to provide fact-finders with more complete, 
reliable, and precise information when determining a defendant’s fate. My 
study also shows that courts accept neuroscience evidence for this purpose, 
and in fact expect attorneys to raise this evidence when possible on behalf of 
their clients. This expectation is so entrenched that courts are willing to grant 
defendants their “ineffective assistance of counsel” claims when attorneys fail 
to pursue this mitigating evidence. Meanwhile, my study also reveals that the 
potential future danger posed by defendants is rarely a facet of cases involving 
neuroscience evidence—again contradicting the myth of the double-edged 
sword. The cases that do address future danger, however, offer fascinating in-
sight into the complex legal issues raised by neuroscience evidence. As courts 
continue to embrace neuroscience tools and techniques, the empirical data col-
lected in my study provide a foundation for discussions regarding the use of 
neuroscience evidence in criminal cases. The findings presented in this Article 
will ensure that those discussions are grounded in fact rather than hyperbole. 
INTRODUCTION 
A little explanation can go a long way . . . the difference between life 
and death.1 
In 2010, shortly after escaping from prison, John McCluskey killed a 
retired couple in order to steal their camping trailer.2 The crime was horrif-
ic: McCluskey and two accomplices shot the defenseless couple inside their 
trailer and then set their truck ablaze with their bodies inside.3 Yet a jury 
rejected the death penalty, instead sentencing McCluskey to life in prison 
without the possibility of parole.4 The jury’s life-over-death choice was 
seemingly influenced by the defense’s introduction of brain scans indicating 
substantial damage to McCluskey’s frontal lobe.5 According to legal ana-
lysts, the jury viewed McCluskey’s brain abnormalities as a mitigating fac-
tor that decreased his level of culpability and ability to plan or intend such a 
                                                                                                                           
 1 Caro v. Woodford, 280 F.3d 1247, 1249 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 2 See Third Superseding Indictment at 3, United States v. McCluskey, 893 F. Supp. 2d 1117 
(2012) (No. 10-cr-02734), 2012 WL 6704922, at *3; Transcript of Record at 4558, McCluskey, 
893 F. Supp. 2d at 1117 (transcript of trial on the merits). 
 3 See Transcript of Record, supra note 2, at 4558 (transcript of trial on the merits). 
McCluskey was convicted in federal court of carjacking and two murders. See id. at 12031 (tran-
script of punishment phase). 
 4 See id. at 13049 (transcript of punishment phase). 
 5 Motion to Rebut Defendant’s Mental Health Expert Testimony at 3–4, McCluskey, 893 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1117; Ruben C. Gur, Ph.D., Neurobehavioral Assessment of Mr. McCluskey (Oct. 2, 
2013) (report submitted to Michael Burt, Attorney at Law) (on file with Author). 
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crime, rather than as an aggravating factor that heightened his future danger 
to society.6 
Courtroom battles over mitigating and aggravating evidence are a com-
mon aspect of capital cases, but the unprecedented use of neuroscience evi-
dence in these battles has led to some striking outcomes.7 In 2010, for exam-
ple, a judge ruled brain mapping evidence admissible for the first time, noting 
its “ability to provide vital information on brain injury and impairment.”8 The 
defendant, Grady Nelson, was convicted in Miami of first degree murder after 
stabbing his wife sixty times, and then also stabbing his step-children.9 De-
spite Nelson’s appalling crimes, the jury declined a death sentence,10 with 
some jurors noting in post-verdict interviews that neuroscience evidence of 
Nelson’s mental incapacity dissuaded them from issuing a death sentence.11 
The rising acceptance of neuroscience evidence has fueled heated debate 
regarding its impact on the criminal justice system.12 The criminal law has 
focused on the human mind and mental states since the seventeenth century, 
yet the field of neuroscience is relatively young.13 The first use of the term 
                                                                                                                           
 6 See Scott Sandlin, McCluskey Gets Life in Prison for Killing Couple, ALBUQUERQUE J. 
(Dec. 12, 2013), http://www.abqjournal.com/318501/news/mccluskey-gets-life-in-prison-for-killing-
couple.html, archived at http://perma.cc/M2BD-ZHEG; Greg Miller, Did Brain Scans Just Save a 
Convicted Murderer from the Death Penalty?, WIRED (Dec. 12, 2013), http://www.wired.com/
wiredscience/2013/12/murder-law-brain/, archived at http://perma.cc/W249-CBPV. 
 7 See generally Michael J. Saks, The Impact of Neuroimages in the Sentencing Phase of Capi-
tal Trials, 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 105 (2014) (discussing the effect of supplementing neu-
roscience evidence with neuroscience imaging in the courtroom); O. Carter Snead, Neuroimaging 
and the “Complexity” of Capital Punishment, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1265 (2008) (discussing and 
critiquing then-current and aspirational uses of neuroscience in capital cases). 
 8 Judge Okays QEEG Evidence for Grady Nelson, PRWEB (Oct. 30, 2010) [hereinafter Judge 
Okays QEEG Evidence] (citations and internal quotations omitted), http://www.prweb.com/
releases/GradyNelsonTrial/QEEGBrainMapping/prweb4718954.html, archived at https://perma.cc/
X2U3-QNWE?type=image; see Francis Shen, The Law and Neuroscience Bibliography: Navi-
gating the Emerging Field of Neurolaw, 38 INT’L J. LEGAL INFO. 352, 352 (2010). The particular 
brain mapping evidence in the Nelson case was quantitative electroencephalography (QEEG), 
“[t]he computerized analysis that separates the EEG recorded on the scalp into wave frequency 
components.” OWEN D. JONES ET AL., LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE 764 (2014). 
 9 State v. Nelson, No. F05-846 (11th Fla. Cir. Ct. Dec. 2, 2010), archived at https://perma.cc/
7XA5-2JXG?type=pdf; Judge Okays QEEG Evidence, supra note 8; Miller, supra note 6. For 
more information, see generally Transcript of Opening Statement, Nelson, No. F05-846, archived 
at https://perma.cc/6TZZ-NZHA?type=pdf. 
 10 Transcript of Defense Closing Argument, Nelson, No. F05-846, archived at https://perma.
cc/M4ZU-ZGXM?type=pdf; Press Release, S. Fla. Reception Cntr. (Mar. 3, 2015), archived at 
https://perma.cc/TP7N-TG8W?type=pdf; see also Miller, supra note 6.  
 11 Miller, supra note 6. 
 12 See generally Joshua Greene & Jonathan Cohen, For the Law, Neuroscience Changes 
Nothing and Everything, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y: BIOLOGICAL SCI. 1775 (2004) 
(discussing the key debates regarding the criminal law and neuroscience). 
 13 See Deborah W. Denno, Criminal Law in a Post-Freudian World, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 
602, 609–13 [hereinafter Denno, Post-Freudian World] (discussing the evolution of mens rea); 
Deborah W. Denno, Crime and Consciousness: Science and Involuntary Acts, 87 MINN. L. REV. 
269, 269–314 (2002) [hereinafter Denno, Consciousness] (analyzing the historical development of 
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neuroscience did not even occur until 1963.14 The term is defined in varying 
ways, but the definition provided by the American Association for the Ad-
vancement of Science is representative: neuroscience is “the branch of life 
sciences that studies the brain and nervous systems [including] . . . brain pro-
cesses such as sensation, perception, learning, memory, and movement.”15 
Recent neuroscience research focuses on an even newer discipline—that of 
cognitive neuroscience, which combines cognitive science, psychology, and 
neuroscience to examine the mechanisms of the mind, such as motor func-
tion, language, higher cognitive functions, emotions, and consciousness.16 
Key criminal law concepts of culpability depend on the internal work-
ings of individuals’ minds. Revelations about a defendant’s level of inten-
tionality or consciousness are just some examples of areas where new dis-
coveries could improve the criminal justice system.17 Yet, neuroscience evi-
dence can be portrayed as a potential “double-edged sword: it may diminish 
[a defendant’s] blameworthiness for his crime even as it indicates that there 
is a probability that he will be dangerous in the future.”18 This Article refers 
to this misconception as the “myth of the double-edged sword.” Specifical-
ly, much of the debate surrounding the intersection of neuroscience and the 
criminal law centers on the mistaken assumption that neuroscience evidence 
will abdicate violent criminals of all responsibility for their crimes—
especially those like McCluskey and Nelson.19 In contrast, others fear that 
                                                                                                                           
conscious and unconscious thought processes as they pertain to the law); Definition of Neurosci-
ence, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.
com/dictionary/neuroscience, archived at http://perma.cc/3WTL-5B7J (last visited Mar. 11, 2015) 
(providing that the “[f]irst [k]nown [u]se” of the term “Neuroscience” did not occur until 1963). 
 14 See MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, supra note 13; Definition of Neuroscience, 
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/235290?redirectedFrom
=neuroscience#eid, archived at http://perma.cc/ZRY7-AS33 (last visited Mar. 11, 2015) (identify-
ing the first known use of the term “neuroscience as a 1963 research program bulletin title”). 
 15 BRENT GARLAND, NEUROSCIENCE AND THE LAW: BRAIN, MIND, AND THE SCALES OF 
JUSTICE 206 (2004). 
 16 JAMIE WARD, THE STUDENT’S GUIDE TO COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 4 (2d ed. 2010). 
 17 See Denno, Post-Freudian World, supra note 13, at 640–44 (discussing state of mind, or 
mens rea, as it is used to define criminal conduct by the Model Penal Code). 
 18 Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 324 (1989); see also Owen D. Jones & Francis X. Shen, 
Law and Neuroscience in the United States, in INTERNATIONAL NEUROLAW: A COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS 349, 362 (T.M. Spranger ed., 2012) (“Using neuroscience evidence in capital sentenc-
ing . . . introduces a double-edged sword problem that multiple commentators have recog-
nized. . . . That is, a brain too broken may be simply too dangerous to have at large, even if it is 
somehow less culpable.”); Snead, supra note 7, at 1338 (Snead cautions against the use of neuro-
science evidence in death penalty cases, despite its mitigating potential, because aspects of the 
capital sentencing process “—most notably, the aggravating factor of future dangerousness—are 
no friend to the capital defendant. In fact, they are often the gravest threat to his life.”). 
 19 For some extreme views on the use and impact of the neuroscience evidence introduced in 
cases including those of John McCluskey and Grady Nelson, see Eric Markowitz, The New Mur-
der Defense: My Brain Made Me Do It, VOCATIV (Nov. 13, 2013, 2:24 PM), http://www.vocativ.
com/culture/science/new-murder-defense-brain-made/, archived at http://perma.cc/V5FU-NDHP 
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such evidence could bolster predictions of defendants’ purported future 
danger to society, thereby unfairly generating longer prison terms or even 
the death penalty.20 Meanwhile, media accounts of some particularly con-
troversial cases have alarmed the public with inaccurate narratives of how 
courts use neuroscience evidence and how neuroscience fits into the frame-
work of the criminal justice system.21 The complexity of these legal issues 
will only expand as the science progresses and becomes increasingly com-
mon in courtrooms.22 
 Numerous scholars have offered insightful assessments of the legal 
issues that arise at the intersection of law and neuroscience.23 The bulk of 
                                                                                                                           
(focusing on John McCluskey and arguing that neuroscience is infiltrating the criminal law to the 
advantage of criminals far beyond what our current understanding of neuroscience should permit); 
Priya Shetty, Law and Order: Blame It on the Brain, BBC (July 11, 2012), http://www.bbc.com/
future/story/20120710-blame-it-on-the-brain, archived at https://perma.cc/SV7C-RE99?type=pdf 
(focusing on Grady Nelson and discussing a group of scientists and doctors who feel that at least 
some neuroscience evidence is simply not well enough understood to be used conclusively in 
courtrooms today). 
 20 See Nicholas Mackintosh, Guilty Minds, NEW SCIENTIST, Dec. 17, 2011, at 26–27 (“Rather 
than such evidence serving to reduce a criminal’s sentence, one could argue that it might be used to 
increase it, or at least influence decisions about release or parole.”); Peter McKnight, The Ethical 
Minefield of Using Neuroscience to Prevent Crime (Part 2 of 3): Is It Moral to Make Changes to a 
Person’s Brain If It Benefits Both the Offender and Society?, VANCOUVER SUN, Dec. 10, 2012, 
http://www.vancouversun.com/health/ethical+minefield+using+neuroscience+prevent+crime+Part/7
674188/story.html, archived at https://perma.cc/9SSV-L97N?type=pdf (“[N]euroscience could in-
deed lead to defendants being found less blameworthy. But such evidence could also backfire, for 
judges could conclude that the neuroscience shows the defendant is constitutively, irremediably dan-
gerous, and hence must be locked away for a longer period of time to protect the public.”). 
 21 See Kate Kelland, Insight—Neuroscience in Court: My Brain Made Me Do It, REUTERS, 
Aug. 29, 2012, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/29/us-neuroscience-crime-id
USBRE87S07020120829, archived at http://perma.cc/C4X2-42C5 (examining a number of ex-
treme cases where neuroscience evidence has been used, branding neuroscience as the “my brain 
made me do it” defense, and citing a number of sources arguing that neuroscience is being misap-
plied and far overextended in courts of law). 
 22 See generally Owen D. Jones et al., Law and Neuroscience, 33 J. NEUROSCIENCE 17624 
(2013) (discussing the growth of neuroscience and the ways the criminal justice system can handle 
it). 
 23 There is currently a multilayered debate among scholars regarding the impact cognitive 
neuroscience will have on the law. Theoretically speaking, some scholars believe that cognitive 
neuroscience will challenge our traditional notions of free will, which, in turn, will dramatically 
alter the way society views criminal punishment. See Greene & Cohen, supra note 12, at 1784 
(explaining that “free will as we ordinarily understand it is an illusion generated by our cognitive 
architecture,” and since “retributivist notions of criminal responsibility ultimately depend on this 
illusion,” they will give way to a criminal justice system based solely on consequentialism). But 
see Stephen J. Morse, Avoiding Irrational Neurolaw Exuberance: A Plea for Neuromodesty, 62 
MERCER L. REV. 837, 855 (2011) (arguing that “[g]iven how little we know about the brain-mind 
and brain-action connections, to claim that we should radically change our picture of ourselves, 
legal doctrines, and practices based on neuroscience is a form of neuroarrogance”); Amanda C. 
Pustilnik, Violence on the Brain: A Critique of Neuroscience in Criminal Law, 44 WAKE FOREST 
L. REV. 183, 237 (2009) (“[The] claim that the criminal law can understand violence principally as 
emerging from localized brain dysfunction in people who are neurobiologically distinct is simpler 
than possible.”). Similarly, there is an ongoing debate regarding the specific practical applications 
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the academic writing, however, has been confined to small-scale empirical 
studies or to a handful of unusual cases, whether real or theoretical.24 This 
focus by scholars on the outliers and unlikely cases tends to distort the dia-
logue on neuroscience with misconceptions about the actual impact of neu-
roscience on the law.25 Until now, there has been no comprehensive nation-
wide account of how neuroscience is actually used to evaluate a defendant’s 
mental state within a universe of criminal cases.26 With this Article, I seek 
to fill that void. I have conducted an unprecedented empirical study (“Neu-
roscience Study” or “Study”) of all criminal cases (totaling 800 cases) that 
addressed neuroscience evidence over the course of two decades (1992–
2012). The Neuroscience Study provides, for the first time, extensive and 
systematic empirical data that show how neuroscience evidence is used in 
courtrooms. These data enable us to look beyond assumptions and miscon-
ceptions, particularly the myth of the double-edged sword.  
In presenting the results of the Neuroscience Study, I do not engage in 
debates over the appropriate use of neuroscience evidence. That important 
topic has been discussed in-depth elsewhere.27 Instead, the Neuroscience 
Study reveals the marked degree to which such evidence has been integrat-
ed into the criminal justice system in ways that have never before been doc-
umented or analyzed. The Study also uncovers a criminal justice system 
that is surprisingly willing to accept and comprehend both the strengths and 
                                                                                                                           
of neuroscience evidence. For example, many scholars advocate the use of neuroscience evidence 
by death penalty defendants to bolster their mitigation claims during sentencing. See John H. 
Blume & Emily C. Paavola, Life, Death, and Neuroimaging: The Advantages and Disadvantages 
of the Defense's Use of Neuroimages in Capital Cases—Lessons from the Front, 62 MERCER L. 
REV. 909, 914 (2011) (explaining that neuroimaging “can make the difference between life and 
death” in a defendant’s mitigation presentation); Adam Lamparello, Neuroscience, Brain Damage, 
and the Criminal Defendant: Who Does It Help and Where in the Criminal Proceeding Is It Most 
Relevant?, 39 RUTGERS L. REC. 161, 178 (2012) (arguing that neuroscience evidence of traumatic 
brain injuries is “substantially relevant and probative” during the sentencing phase of a capital 
trial, and that demonstrated injuries to the defendant’s frontal lobe and amygdala should warrant a 
term of life in prison instead of the death penalty). But see Jones & Shen, supra note 18, at 362 
(discussing the “double-edged sword problem”); Snead, supra note 7, at 1338 (emphasizing the 
“threat” of the future dangerousness aggravator to capital defendants). For a parallel discussion 
regarding the controversy surrounding the use of behavioral genetics in criminal law, see Deborah 
W. Denno, Courts’ Increasing Consideration of Behavioral Genetics Evidence in Criminal Cases: 
Results of a Longitudinal Study, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 967, 1008–27. 
 24 For the most thorough and recent overview of this research, see generally JONES ET AL., 
supra note 8. 
 25 For an example of such distortion, see Markowitz, supra note 19; see also Shetty, supra 
note 19 (addressing previous scholarly attention to extreme views on the use and impact of neuro-
science evidence). 
 26 In separate articles, Neal Feigenson and Carter Snead come the closest to offering such 
published and systematic accounts. See Neal Feigenson, Brain Imaging and Courtroom Evidence: 
On the Admissibility and Persuasiveness of fMRI, 2 INT’L J.L. CONTEXT 233, 233–55 (2006); 
Snead, supra note 7. 
 27 See generally JONES ET AL., supra note 8. 
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limitations of neuroscience evidence in ways that clearly discredit the myth 
of the double-edged sword. Rather than simply furthering current theoreti-
cal debates, this Study suggests that the substance of such debates should 
change. Indeed, the results of the Neuroscience Study spur a straightfor-
ward, yet perhaps unexpected, conclusion: the key question we should be 
asking is not whether neuroscience evidence should be used in the criminal 
justice system, but rather how and why. 
In an effort to begin answering this how-and-why question, Part I of 
this Article describes the Neuroscience Study and some of its most funda-
mental findings.28 Neuroscience evidence is typically raised in cases where 
defendants are facing a severe sentence, such as the death penalty, a life 
sentence, or a substantial prison sentence.29 Yet contrary to the myth of the 
double-edged sword, the Study reveals that such evidence is most common-
ly introduced for an important yet relatively conventional purpose: as part 
of an effort to mitigate a defendant’s sentence.30 Indeed, this Study uncov-
ers a criminal justice system that is willing to embrace innovative methods 
of assessing defendants’ mental capabilities, and expects its attorneys to do 
the same.  
Part II of this Article focuses on this latter point—courts’ expectations 
of attorneys.31 Part II explains how the standards articulated by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington32 are applied in the context of 
neuroscience evidence and presents one of the Neuroscience Study’s most 
striking findings: many courts not only expect attorneys to investigate and 
use available neuroscience evidence when it is appropriate, but also penal-
ize attorneys who neglect this obligation. In an effort to better discern the 
parameters of courts’ requirements, Part II concludes by examining a num-
ber of cases in which courts found attorneys’ approaches to available neuro-
science evidence to be ineffective. 
Part III tests one the most widely held myths of the double-edged 
sword—that prosecutors will use neuroscience evidence to fuel arguments 
that a defendant is a future danger and therefore deserves death or extensive 
incarceration. The Neuroscience Study’s findings are clear: neuroscience 
evidence is only rarely used to argue a defendant’s future dangerousness.33 
Yet the topic itself is more nuanced, and Part III concludes by warning at-
torneys of the contradictions that neuroscience evidence can bring. 
                                                                                                                           
 28 See infra notes 34–68 and accompanying text. 
 29 See infra Chart 1. For the reader’s convenience, the charts discussed in this Article are 
archived at https://perma.cc/7QV8-L8F8?type=pdf. 
 30 See infra Charts 6–7. 
 31 See infra notes 70–274 and accompanying text. 
 32 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (establishing the standards for evaluating attorneys’ performanc-
es on behalf of their clients). 
 33 See infra notes 276–448 and accompanying text (discussing future dangerousness). 
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I. THE NEUROSCIENCE STUDY: 1992–2012 
Science and law have long intersected, but neuroscience is a relatively 
new concept to many.34 In collecting data for the Neuroscience Study, I de-
fined “neuroscience evidence” as incorporating two broad groups of tests: 35 
“imaging tests,” which are generated by computer images of a human 
brain—such as those tests listed in Chart 436—and “non-imaging tests,” 
which are based on tests administered by a medical professional to an indi-
vidual for the purpose of gaining insight into how that person’s brain oper-
ates—such as those tests listed in Chart 5.37 The 800 criminal law cases ad-
dressing neuroscience evidence from January 1, 1992 to December 31, 
201238 were collected employing the Westlaw and Lexis legal databases.39 I 
used information from these cases to code and analyze over 100 key factors 
                                                                                                                           
 34 See MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, supra note 13; OXFORD ENGLISH DIC-
TIONARY ONLINE, supra note 14 (noting that the term “neuroscience” only surfaced in the 1960s). 
 35 See Ellen G. Koenig, A Fair Trial: When the Constitution Requires Attorneys to Investigate 
Their Clients’ Brains, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 177, 194–95 (2013) (dividing neuroscience evi-
dence into “brain scans” and “neuroscience evaluations”). Functional brain scans (EEG, PET, 
SPECT, fMRI) “are computer images of a person’s brain that show how his brain works by track-
ing how blood flows through the brain.” Id. at 195. Structural, or organic brain scans (MRI, CT), 
“show what the brain’s structure looks like.” Id. at 197. 
 36 See infra Chart 4. 
 37 See infra Chart 5.  
 38 All statistics and case distributions discussed in this Article are available from the Author 
in an extensive statistical appendix. See Neuroscience Study Stat. App. (on file with Author) 
[hereinafter “Stat. App.”]; see also DEBORAH W. DENNO, CHANGING LAW’S MIND: HOW NEU-
ROSCIENCE CAN HELP US PUNISH CRIMINALS MORE FAIRLY AND EFFECTIVELY (2016). 
 39 The case selection techniques employed for the Neuroscience Study were comparable to 
those used in my prior studies of behavioral genetics evidence in criminal cases. See Denno, supra 
note 23, at 1035–47. For this Article’s Study, searches for decisions were conducted using 
Westlaw and Lexis, applying parameters that included the following cases: published opinions, 
unpublished opinions, opinions that are slated to be published, and opinions in which the state of 
publication is, at the time of this Article’s writing, unclear. In order to make the content of this 
Article’s search consistent across all cases, the search looked only at opinions. The search did not 
look at the briefs for those opinions because case briefs are not available for all cases in either the 
Westlaw or Lexis databases. As mentioned, the search incorporated judicial decisions released 
between January 1, 1992, and December 31, 2012. In order to collect the relevant opinions and to 
make the search consistent with the Author’s past studies, the search was limited to decisions in 
which courts reference permutations of the following terms: “neuro or brain,” “MRI,” “fMRI,” 
“PET scan,” “CAT scan,” “CT scan,” “SPECT,” “EEG,” “BEAM,” or “brain fingerprinting.” 
Some of the searches also contained the terms “ineffective” or “effective” (where those terms 
appeared within three words of the word “assistance”), and also title assignations used by experts, 
such as “Dr.” To be included in this Article’s study, a court must have announced a disposition in 
a case where a party either introduced or sought to introduce neuroscience evidence at any point in 
the proceeding (e.g., innocence-or-guilt phase, penalty phase, post-conviction hearing, evidentiary 
hearing, etc.). Cases in which neuroscience evidence was introduced post-trial were included in 
the Study only if the court took action on the basis of that evidence. Such action could consist of 
granting an evidentiary hearing, finding ineffective assistance of counsel for counsel’s failure to 
pursue the evidence, or finding prior court error for failure to admit the evidence. The Author also 
required that the court have considered the neuroscience evidence as part of its rationale for a 
particular holding.  
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relevant to the criminal justice system.40 Although some cases that discuss 
neuroscience evidence do not find their way into the Westlaw and Lexis 
databases (for example, because they have never been reported), those that 
do can be retrieved by anyone who would like to verify or replicate my 
methods. This selection strategy also provides relative consistency and ac-
countability across the twenty years this Study examines.  
The Neuroscience Study’s 800 cases are documented in separate Ap-
pendixes on file with the Author.41 The cases fall into three categories: 247 
cases (30.88%) concern neuroscience evidence as it pertains to the victim, 
primarily to prove the extent of a victim’s brain injury;42 514 cases 
(64.25%) concern neuroscience evidence as it pertains to the defendant; and 
thirty-nine cases (4.88%) concern neuroscience evidence as it pertains to 
both the defendant and the victim because the brains of one or more indi-
viduals in both the “victim” and “defendant” categories were examined.43 
The focus of this Article is on the cases in the latter two categories—
“defendant” and “both victim and defendant”—which comprise 553 cases 
or 69.13% of the total data set of 800 cases. This Article refers to these two 
categories generically as “Defendant Cases.” 
A. Crimes and Punishments 
The vast majority of the Neuroscience Study’s Defendant Cases in-
volve defendants convicted of murder.44 As Chart 1 shows,45 two-thirds of 
                                                                                                                           
 40 See Stat. App., supra note 38; see also DENNO, supra note 38. The Author supervised the 
coding of all data. Data were coded with the assistance of three J.D. graduates of Fordham Law 
School with a strong interest in law and neuroscience. These coders were Daniel Goddin, J.D., 
Jeremy Gold, J.D., and Ellen Koenig, J.D. These coders worked together and spot-checked each 
other at key points in time during the Neuroscience Study, thereby ensuring inter-rater reliability 
and consistency. The coding efforts of these three were then checked again for validity and relia-
bility by four additional coders, all current J.D. candidates at Fordham Law School. These coders 
were Aaron Neishlos, Madhundra Sivakumar, David Tarras, and Katherine Yi. 
 41 See Stat. App., supra note 38; see also DENNO, supra note 38. 
 42 These victim cases follow a pattern that is distinct from other types of cases because neuro-
science evidence is used to prove the extent of a victim’s injury and it is mostly introduced by the 
State. In a typical victim injury case, a prosecutor introduces into court a CAT scan of the brain of 
a baby who has been shaken, or of an adult who has suffered a gunshot wound to the head. This 
neuroscience evidence, which almost always comes in the form of brain imaging, is used to prove 
either the perpetrator’s intent (to abuse, injure, or kill) and thus his guilt, or it is used for the pur-
poses of requesting a harsher sentence based on the severity of the injury inflicted upon the victim. 
See State v. McDowell, 715 S.E.2d 602, 604 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011) (“Dr. Riemer identified forty-
five gunshot wounds to Mr. Howell’s body, including a sufficient number of entrance and exit 
wounds in Mr. Howell’s head that his entire brain was destroyed.”); see also Stat. App., supra 
note 38; DENNO, supra note 38 (listing and examining all victim cases). 
 43 See Stat. App., supra note 38; see also DENNO, supra note 38. 
 44 See Stat. App., supra note 38; see also DENNO, supra note 38. The 553 defendants were 
convicted of the following crimes (only the most serious crime conviction per defendant is listed): 
366 murder convictions that resulted in a death sentence; ninety-five murder convictions that did 
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the Defendant Cases (366 cases or 66.18%) began as capital cases in which 
the defendant was eligible for the death penalty even if that sentence was 
later reduced. Defendants in the remaining cases (187 cases or 33.82%) 
faced disproportionately severe sentences.46 Among these non-death penalty 
cases, less than half (80 cases or 42.78%) were given a sentence of life ei-
ther with or without the possibility of parole. The other 107 cases were 
mostly allotted prison sentences of substantial length. In sum, my analysis 
indicates that neuroscience evidence is typically used in cases where de-
fendants face the death penalty, a life sentence, or a substantial prison sen-
tence. 
The Neuroscience Study also reveals that neuroscience evidence is 
employed at different stages of cases. In a capital case, neuroscience may be 
incorporated during the guilt-or-innocence phase and/or the penalty phase.47 
The guilt-or-innocence phase requires the State to prove beyond a reasona-
ble doubt that a defendant committed an alleged crime; this phase invites 
the use of defenses that suggest a defendant was not fully responsible.48 In 
the penalty phase, the jury has found the defendant guilty of the capital 
crime and is determining whether to sentence the defendant to death.49 The 
great majority of death penalty states require that the jury consider both ev-
idence of aggravation from the State and evidence of mitigation from the 
defense.50 In this Study, the concept of mitigation is not exclusive to death 
penalty cases, but that is by far the most common context in which the term 
is used.51 In most jurisdictions, aggravating factors must outweigh mitigat-
ing factors for a defendant to be sentenced to death.52 
                                                                                                                           
not result in a death sentence; one negligent homicide; five attempted murder or conspiracy to 
commit murder; six sexual assaults; thirteen robbery, burglary, theft or home invasion; seventeen 
assault or battery; four child abuse; seven fraud or conspiracy to commit fraud; one arson; seven-
teen drug trafficking or drug possession; one criminal possession of a weapon; one distribution of 
child pornography; one filing false public records and perjury; one escape; five driving under the 
influence or leaving the scene; one criminal mistreatment; one bribery; two racketeering or mak-
ing threats; one illegal gambling; and seven unknown charges. Id. 
 45 See infra Chart 1. 
 46 Chart 1 shows the most serious sentence for which a defendant was eligible. For example, 
if a defendant was sentenced for seventeen years-to-life, Chart 1 categorizes that defendant as 
having a life sentence. For some cases, an opinion was adjudicated without the use of a sentence. 
In other cases, the defendant had yet to be sentenced at the time of the opinion’s publication. See 
id. 
 47 See Blume & Paavola, supra note 23, at 914 (discussing the two phases of capital cases 
generally and the application of neuroimaging as mitigation). 
 48 See id.  
 49 Id. at 914–15. 
 50 Id. (“Unlike the decision the jurors made during the guilt-or-innocence phase of the pro-
ceedings . . . this decision is not . . . a determination of fact, for example, did the defendant do it, 
but a moral and normative choice—does he deserve to die?” (internal quotations omitted)).  
 51 See Stat. App., supra note 38; see also DENNO, supra note 38. In the Neuroscience Study 
there were about a dozen cases that used the term “mitigation” to apply to the goals of certain 
2015] Neuroscience Evidence in Criminal Cases 503 
Mitigating factors usually include information about a capital defend-
ant’s background and life prior to his crime, whereas aggravating factors 
include the circumstances surrounding a crime and a defendant’s prior crim-
inal record.53 Death penalty jurisdictions vary with respect to the types of 
mitigating and aggravating circumstances that they permit fact-finders to 
consider; but the U.S. Supreme Court has made clear that defendants can 
present mitigating evidence relevant to “any aspect of [the] defendant’s 
character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the de-
fendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.”54 This highly 
open-ended standard allows for a full range of mitigating factors to be in-
troduced; most attorneys weave these facts into a compelling “story” that 
can be critical to determining a defendant’s fate.55 
The Neuroscience Study is the first empirical study to systematically 
investigate how courts assess the mitigating and aggravating strength of 
neuroscience evidence. My analysis reveals that neuroscience evidence is 
usually offered to mitigate punishments in the way that traditional criminal 
law has always allowed, especially in the penalty phases of death penalty 
trials. This finding is noteworthy because it controverts the popular image 
of neuroscience evidence as a double-edged sword—one that will either get 
defendants off the hook altogether or unfairly brand them as posing a future 
danger to society. To the contrary, the Neuroscience Study indicates that 
neuroscience evidence is typically introduced for well-established legal 
                                                                                                                           
defenses such as extreme mental or emotional disturbance or insanity. See Stat. App., supra note 
38; see also DENNO, supra note 38. 
 52 James R. Acker & Charles S. Lanier, Matters of Life or Death: The Sentencing Provisions 
in Capital Punishment Statutes, 31 CRIM. L. BULL. 19, 33–52 (1995) (discussing state law sen-
tencing formulas generally). But see Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 173, 181 (2006) (upholding a 
Kansas death penalty statute that allowed jurors to impose the death penalty when aggravating 
circumstances and mitigating circumstances were equally distributed). In all circumstances it 
should be noted that if a defendant challenges a death sentence, a reviewing court must reweigh 
the aggravating evidence against the totality of available mitigating evidence. See Wiggins v. 
Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 534 (2003). For an insightful discussion of mitigating and aggravating fac-
tors and how they interplay, see O. Carter Snead, Memory and Punishment, 64 VAND. L. REV. 
1195, 1248–51 (2011). 
 53 See Malone v. State, 168 P.3d 185, 223 (Okla. Crim. App. 2007). 
 54 Marsh, 548 U.S. at 174 (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978)) (internal quo-
tations omitted). The Marsh Court explained that state courts are allowed significant license to 
determine “the manner in which aggravating and mitigating circumstances” should be weighed so 
long as those courts had rationally narrowed the class of “death-eligible defendants” and permitted 
juries to consider a defendant’s “record, personal characteristics, and the circumstances of his 
crime” in rendering a sentence. Id. 
 55 Blume & Paavola, supra note 23, at 914–15. As one court noted, “mitigation evidence can, 
quite literally, make the difference between life and death in a capital case.” Marquez-Burrola v. 
State, 157 P.3d 749, 764 (Okla. Crim. App. 2007). 
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purposes—to provide fact-finders with more complete, reliable, and precise 
information when determining a defendant’s fate.56 
B. A Range of Innovative Tests 
Mitigation is by no means the exclusive purpose for which neurosci-
ence evidence is introduced. Indeed, the push for mitigation is commonly 
accompanied by a complex range of defense strategies, with a full menu of 
legal doctrines explicated by neuroscience evidence.57 Neuroscience evi-
dence is primarily used for mitigation, however, in both death penalty and 
non-death penalty cases. Accordingly, this Section will discuss some of the 
kinds of mitigating neuroscience evidence available to attorneys.  
As Chart 2 shows,58 the most prevalent mental and behavioral disor-
ders ascribed to defendants by way of neuroscience evidence include disor-
ders of adult personality and behavior, mental and behavioral disorders due 
to psychoactive substance abuse, schizophrenia, schizotypal and delusional 
disorder, and organic mental disorders.59 Diagnoses are most commonly 
issued by expert medical professionals, although sources such as self-report 
and hospital records may also be employed.60 Notably, although Chart 2 
presents information on the prevalence of confirmed diagnoses, many cases 
involved expert testimony regarding the possible existence of these and oth-
er mental and behavioral disorders. For example, Chart 3 shows that one-
half of the cases (271 cases or 49.01%) featured testimony by an expert 
medical professional explaining that the defendant suffered brain damage,61 
which in this study could have been from any one of a number of sources, 
such as childhood beatings, car accidents, or severe alcoholism.62 
                                                                                                                           
 56 See Jones et al., supra note 22, at 17624 (noting the seven ways that “neuroscientific evi-
dence might aid law”). 
 57 See infra notes 70–448 and accompanying text; see also Stat. App., supra note 38; DENNO, 
supra note 38. 
 58 See infra Chart 2. 
 59 For ease of presentation, the diagnoses in Chart 2 are classified using the International 
Classification of Diseases, 10th Revision, Clinical Modification (“ICD-10”), in particular, the 
ICD-10 V: Mental Health and Behavioral Disorders. The ICD-10 is recognized and ratified by all 
193 countries of the World Health Organization. See WORLD HEALTH ORG., ICD-10 CLASSIFICA-
TION OF MENTAL AND BEHAVIOURAL DISORDERS: CLINICAL DESCRIPTIONS AND GUIDELINES 
(2010). This Study’s coder reviewed each opinion to determine specific neurological diagnoses 
ascribed to each defendant. Only expert testimony was considered for the purposes of the coding 
process. The experts at the very least held a doctorate in their respective fields. The diagnosing 
experts covered numerous professions ranging from medical doctors to forensic psychologists, 
neurosurgeons, and pharmacists. See Stat. App., supra note 38; see also DENNO, supra note 38. 
 60 See Stat. App., supra note 38; see also DENNO, supra note 38. 
 61 For detailed glossaries defining and explaining the purposes of many of these tests, see 
JONES ET AL., supra note 8, at 755–67; GARLAND, supra note 15, at 201–09. 
 62 See Stat. App., supra note 38; DENNO, supra note 38. 
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Neuroscience evidence supporting the confirmed diagnoses include a 
swath of tests encompassing both imaging and non-imaging techniques. 
Charts 463 and 564 list the most commonly used tests. At least one type of 
brain imaging test was discussed in nearly two-thirds of the Defendant Cas-
es (350 cases or 63.29%).65 Although the diagnoses and tests listed in 
Charts 2–566 overlap within cases, the array of factors represented in each 
of these charts illustrates the criminal justice system’s reliance on and ac-
ceptance of neuroscience evidence for mitigation purposes. Moreover, the 
results portrayed in these charts make clear that the criminal justice system 
comfortably incorporates even very recent technology for assessing defend-
ants’ mental capabilities. For example, Chart 467 indicates that brain imag-
ing tests known as QEEG scans were referenced or used in fifteen cases, 
despite being first introduced in a courtroom only five years ago in the 2010 
Grady Nelson case.68 
In sum, the Neuroscience Study reveals a modern criminal justice sys-
tem that is open to employing a wide range of neuroscience evidence. As a 
result, attorneys currently prosecuting and defending criminal cases must 
educate themselves about medical and neurological conditions and tests that 
a past generation of lawyers confronted rarely, if at all. Part II will discuss 
one of the most striking findings of the Neuroscience Study, which is that 
courts not only expect attorneys to investigate and use available neurosci-
ence evidence in their cases when it is appropriate, but they penalize attor-
neys who neglect this obligation.69 
II. NEUROSCIENCE AND INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that an attorney’s performance is 
determined by a standard of “prevailing professional norms,”70 which, for 
capital cases, entails a “thorough investigation”71 of “all reasonably availa-
ble mitigating evidence”72 relevant to a defendant’s history and circum-
stances.73 The Court has stressed repeatedly that a key part of this mitiga-
                                                                                                                           
 63 See infra Chart 4. 
 64 See infra Chart 5. 
 65 See infra Chart 4; Stat. App., supra note 38; DENNO, supra note 38. 
 66 See infra Charts 2–5. 
 67 See infra Chart 4. 
 68 See Nelson, No. F05-846; Shen, supra note 8, at 352; Judge Okays QEEG Evidence, supra 
note 8. 
 69 See infra notes 70–274 and accompanying text. 
 70 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). 
 71 Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 39 (2009) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 
396 (2000)). 
 72 Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524 (2003) (emphasis and internal quotations omitted). 
 73 Porter, 558 U.S. at 39. 
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tion inquiry requires attorneys to investigate defendants’ cognitive and intel-
lectual deficiencies because such evidence has a particularly pronounced 
impact on mitigation, especially in death penalty cases.74 
According to the Court, an attorney’s failure to conduct such an inves-
tigation hinders the attorney’s ability to make reasonable strategic decisions 
about how and when to present evidence that may benefit his or her client.75 
Furthermore, those attorneys open themselves up to defendants’ appeals 
claiming prejudicially deficient counsel in violation of the Sixth Amend-
ment, known as an “ineffective assistance of counsel” or Strickland claim.76 
In 1984, in Strickland v. Washington,77 the U.S. Supreme Court estab-
lished a two-pronged test to assess the validity of ineffective assistance of 
counsel challenges. First, counsel’s performance must actually be “deficient,” 
and second, this deficient performance must have “prejudiced” the defend-
ant.78 To be “prejudiced,” the legal counsel must not only be of poor quality, 
but must also be the “but for” cause of the resulting conviction.79 In the Neu-
roscience Study, defendant-petitioners who satisfied this Strickland test were 
typically afforded relief in the form of a new penalty phase,80 reversal of their 
                                                                                                                           
 74 These deficiencies cover a broad span. See Sears v. Upton, 561 U.S. 945, 946 (2010) 
(frontal lobe damage); Porter, 558 U.S. at 36 (brain damage and cognitive defects in reading, 
writing, and memory); Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 392 (2005) (organic brain damage and 
significant cognitive impairments); Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 287 (2004) (impaired intel-
lectual functioning); Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 535 (diminished mental capacities); Williams, 529 U.S. 
at 396 (borderline mental retardation). The American Bar Association Guidelines also advise 
attorneys to conduct an investigation into a defendant’s neurological history as part of a death 
penalty defendant’s mitigation claim. Specifically, the comment to Guideline 4.1 states: “Counsel 
must compile extensive historical data, as well as obtain a thorough physical and neurological 
examination. Diagnostic studies, neuropsychological testing, appropriate brain scans, blood tests 
or genetic studies, and consultation with additional mental health specialists may also be neces-
sary.” ABA, Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Pen-
alty Cases, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 913, 956 (2003). Indeed, scholars have suggested that the ABA’s 
guidelines provide more protection for defendants than the Strickland test. See Koenig, supra note 
35, at 204 (“[U]nder the ABA Guidelines approach, neuroscience evidence should be a real part of 
counsel’s reasonable investigation, and, specifically in capital cases, defense counsel may be inef-
fective for failing to comply with this duty.”). 
 75 See Sears, 561 U.S. at 954 (“We rejected any suggestion that a decision to focus on one 
potentially reasonable trial strategy . . . [can be] ‘justified by a tactical decision’ when ‘counsel did 
not fulfill their obligation to conduct a thorough investigation of the defendant’s background.’” 
(quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 364)). 
 76 See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–92 (establishing and discussing the Strickland test for inef-
fective assistance of counsel). 
 77 Id. at 687. 
 78 Id. 
 79 See id. 
 80 See Stat. App., supra note 38; see also DENNO, supra note 38. 
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conviction for a new trial,81 or a remand with instructions to hold a new evi-
dentiary hearing.82 
As commentators have long noted, however, the Strickland standard 
“is notoriously difficult for defendants to meet” and the percentage of suc-
cessful claims is small.83 Whether a defendant’s lawyer is “asleep, drunk, 
unprepared, or unknowledgeable,” courts still shy away from granting such 
claims.84 One scholar pithily stated that any “lawyer with a pulse will be 
deemed effective.”85 Overwhelmingly, courts presume that attorneys are 
adequate and, even if defendants can surmount this presumption with a 
show of an attorney’s “deficiency,” defendants can still fall short of meeting 
the prejudice prong.86 
Yet Strickland claims are particularly significant when neuroscience 
evidence is at issue, given the U.S. Supreme Court’s emphasis on the miti-
gating value of neuroscience evidence in criminal cases.87 Indeed, the Neu-
roscience Study reveals a remarkable finding: among the Strickland claims 
recorded in the Study’s 553 Defendant Cases, nearly all of the successful 
claims were based on an attorney’s failure to appropriately investigate, 
gather, or understand neuroscience evidence.88 The next Section explains 
this finding in more detail. 
A. The Marked Success of Strickland Claims 
Among the Neuroscience Study’s 553 Defendant Cases, most of the 
defendants raised multiple Strickland claims. These claims ranged from an 
attorney’s mishandling of neuroscience evidence to a broad array of non-
neuroscience issues such as an attorney’s errors during the jury selection 
process, a conflict of interest with multiple clients, or a failure to communi-
cate with a client.89 Chart 690 breaks down the number and success rate of 
                                                                                                                           
 81 See, e.g., State v. Hales, 152 P.3d 321, 325 (Utah 2007) (remanding for a new trial). 
 82 See, e.g., People v. Jacobazzi, 966 N.E.2d 1, 32 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009) (remanding for a fur-
ther evidentiary hearing). 
 83 Carissa Byrne Hessick, Ineffective Assistance at Sentencing, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1069, 1074 
(2009); see also Nancy J. King, Enforcing Effective Assistance After Martinez, 122 YALE L.J. 
2428, 2431 (2013) (noting that prior to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Martinez v. Ryan, 
132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012), “less than 1% of noncapital habeas petitions were granted for any claim” 
and that Martinez will be unlikely to alter this outcome). 
 84 Stephanos Bibas, The Psychology of Hindsight and After-the-Fact Review of Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 1, 1. 
 85 Marc L. Miller, Wise Masters, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1751, 1786 (1999). 
 86 See generally Hessick, supra note 83 (discussing Strickland claims generally and observing 
historical criticisms of the prejudice prong as overly difficult to satisfy). 
 87 See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
 88 See Stat. App., supra note 38; see also DENNO, supra note 38. 
 89 In the Neuroscience Study, it was unusual for a defendant-petitioner to bring only one inef-
fective assistance of counsel claim in a given case. Some of the individual opinions in the Study’s 
data set featured dozens of ineffective assistance of counsel claims with some being centered on 
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these Strickland claims in three ways: all 553 cases, only death penalty cas-
es (366), and only non-death penalty cases (187). As the chart shows, over 
one-half (293 cases or 52.98%) of the 553 defendants raised a Strickland 
claim during litigation.91 Of those 293 cases, over one-quarter (81 cases or 
27.65%) included a successful Strickland claim, meaning that the defend-
ants successfully proved that they met the two prongs of the Strickland test. 
A clear majority of the cases (254 or 86.69%) featured at least one Strick-
land claim based specifically on an issue related to neuroscience evidence. 
In turn, 75 of those 254 cases (or 29.53%) included a Strickland claim that 
was granted, and all but one of those 75 cases were specifically based on 
the attorney’s mishandling or omission of neuroscience evidence (74 cases 
or 98.67%).92 In sum, nearly all successful Strickland claims were based on 
an attorney’s failure to appropriately investigate, gather, or understand neu-
roscience evidence—as opposed to any one of a number of other types of 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims that the Neuroscience Study record-
ed.93 
The next Section will provide more detail regarding the bases for these 
seventy-four claims.94 Courts typically found multiple and often interrelated 
reasons for granting the claims, so the categories discussed in the next Sec-
tion are not mutually exclusive. They are, however, enlightening for under-
standing attorney strategy.95 
B. How Counsel Damage Their Cases 
Results from the Neuroscience Study show that Strickland claims are 
most frequently raised in death penalty cases, presumably because the 
stakes are so high for the defendant.96 Yet as Chart 6 indicates,97 when it 
comes to neuroscience-related Strickland claims, there is little distinction in 
                                                                                                                           
neuroscience evidence (failure to procure a brain imaging scan, failure to plead a diminished ca-
pacity defense, etc.) and some focused on non-neuroscience evidence (such as the improper han-
dling of the jury selection process, failure to object to improper jury instructions, etc.). 
 90 See infra Chart 6. 
 91 See infra Chart 6. 
 92 See infra Chart 6. 
 93 See infra Chart 6; Stat. App., supra note 38; DENNO, supra note 38. 
 94 See infra notes 96–119 and accompanying text. 
 95 The Neuroscience Study statistics presented refer only to a court opinion’s reference to a 
stated theme or trend, and not the court relying solely on that stated theme or trend.  
 96 See infra Chart 6. As Chart 6 shows, in the Neuroscience Study over two-thirds (255 cases 
or 69.67%) of the 366 capital murder defendants raised a Strickland claim during litigation. In 
sharp contrast, only one-fifth (38 cases or 20.32%) of the 187 non-capital murder defendants 
raised a Strickland claim. Of the 255 capital murder cases that raised a Strickland claim, over one-
quarter (72 cases or 28.24%) included a Strickland claim that was granted relative to a somewhat 
smaller percentage of the thirty-eight non-capital murder cases (9 cases or 23.68%). Id. 
 97 See infra Chart 6. 
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proportional frequency between death penalty and non-death penalty cas-
es.98 The overwhelming impact of neuroscience evidence in the grant of a 
Strickland claim is virtually the same for both types of cases.99 Among the 
seventy-four cases that successfully raised neuroscience-related Strickland 
claims, each of the sixty-six death penalty cases resulted in the petitioner’s 
death sentence being vacated.100 In each of the eight non-death penalty cas-
es, habeas relief (reversal of judgment) was granted.101 
In half of the seventy-four cases, the court determined that defense 
counsel “actively” rather than “passively” damaged their clients’ cases.102 I 
use the term “actively” to designate an attorney’s deliberate decision to en-
gage in or refrain from a certain action that prejudiced a client. Conversely I 
use the term “passively” to designate an attorney’s objectively unreasonable 
failure to take a certain course of action that prejudiced a client. The most 
common examples of active damage by attorneys included the following 
scenarios: eliciting damaging testimony from defense witnesses;103 offering 
evidence/testimony for the purpose of mitigation that actually served as ag-
gravating evidence;104 choosing not to ask for a continuance to investigate 
mitigation evidence;105 erroneously presenting the wrong defense or with-
drawing a favorable defense based on the evidence in their possession;106 
                                                                                                                           
 98 Altogether, 221 of the 255 cases in the death penalty group (86.67%) featured at least one 
Strickland claim that was based specifically on the quality of counsel’s handling of neuroscience 
evidence; similarly thirty-three of the thirty-eight cases in the non-death penalty group (86.84%) 
featured one such neuroscience Strickland claim. While these percentages are similar, grants of 
Strickland claims vary. For the death penalty group, sixty-seven of the 221 cases included a 
Strickland claim that was granted (30.32%); yet, for the non-death penalty group, eight of the 
thirty-three cases (24.24%) included a Strickland claim that was granted. That said, the proportion 
of those successful claims based specifically on the mishandling of neuroscience evidence is vir-
tually identical for both groups. For death penalty defendants, sixty-six of the sixty-seven success-
ful claims (or 98.51%) were based specifically on a mishandling of neuroscience evidence where-
as, for non-death penalty defendants, all eight of the eight successful claims were based specifical-
ly on a mishandling of neuroscience evidence. See id. 
 99 See id. 
 100 Stat. App., supra note 38; DENNO, supra note 38. 
 101 See Stat. App., supra note 38; see also DENNO, supra note 38. In some cases, the reversal 
of judgment took one of the following forms: affirmed a lower court’s grant of habeas relief and 
remand, vacated the death sentence to hold an evidentiary hearing regarding the merits of the 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim; granted a Certificate of Appealability for the same pur-
pose; or remanded the lower court’s denial of habeas relief and remand. See Stat. App., supra note 
38; see also DENNO, supra note 38. 
 102 See Stat. App., supra note 38; see also DENNO, supra note 38. 
 103 See Waters v. Zant, 979 F.2d 1473, 1482–94 (11th Cir. 1992), vacated, 11 F.3d 139 (11th 
Cir. 1993). 
 104 See Simmons v. State, 105 So. 3d 475, 507–08 (Fla. 2012). 
 105 See Jackson v. Calderon, 211 F.3d 1148, 1156–61 (9th Cir. 2000); see also State v. Coney, 
845 So. 2d 120, 131–32 (Fla. 2003). 
 106 See Laird v. Horn, 159 F. Supp. 2d 58, 112–13 (E.D. Pa. 2001); State v. Johnson, 794 
A.2d 654, 665–68 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002). 
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advising the client to waive a mitigation presentation;107 choosing not to 
present mitigation at the penalty phase that counsel erroneously believed 
would damage the “humanizing” evidence; or making damaging statements 
of their own.108 
Most (sixty-nine cases or 93.24%) of the seventy-four cases involving 
a successful neuroscience-related Strickland claim were based on trial 
counsel’s failure to adequately present a case in mitigation (“FTPM”).109 
This is a very broad category involving several overlapping sub-categories 
of deficient performance.110 Nearly one third of the sixty-nine cases con-
tained both an FTPM claim and an additional similar yet separate Strickland 
claim.111 These additional claims included the following deficiencies: coun-
sel’s failure to adequately investigate and present a mental health defense; 
counsel’s failure to consult a necessary mental health expert; and, in two 
cases, counsel’s failure to adequately understand or be familiar with the 
American Bar Association guidelines for attorney representation in capital 
murder cases.112 
                                                                                                                           
 107 See Lynch v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 897 F. Supp. 2d 1277, 1290–91, 1306–09 (M.D. Fla. 
2012), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, No. 12-15188, 2015 WL 108623 (11th Cir. Jan. 8, 2015). 
 108 See Smith v. Stewart, 241 F.3d 1191, 1193 (9th Cir. 2001), rev'd, 536 U.S. 856 (2002). 
 109 Stat. App., supra note 38; DENNO, supra note 38. The legal standard for failure to ade-
quately present a case in mitigation derives from Strickland: “[t]he right to present, and to have 
the sentencer consider, any and all mitigating evidence means little if defense counsel fails to look 
for mitigating evidence or fails to present a case in mitigation at the capital sentencing hearing. 
Accordingly, counsel’s general duty to investigate takes on supreme importance . . . . ” Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 706 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citation and internal quotations omitted). 
 110 Deficient performance in this category often included a failure to sufficiently investi-
gate/present evidence and/or testimony of the following: psychological impairment, neurologic 
(functional and organic) impairment, social history containing mental dysfunction cues (including 
potentially favorable family and friend testimony), mental health history (including prior medical 
records, evaluations, and history of drug and/or alcohol abuse), and several other related pieces of 
neuroscience evidence. Stat. App., supra note 38; DENNO, supra note 38. 
 111 See Stat. App., supra note 38; see also DENNO, supra note 38. 
 112 See Stat. App., supra note 38; see also DENNO, supra note 38. Examples of these mental 
health defenses include a diminished capacity defense, insanity defense, or a defense based on 
defendant’s mental retardation or incompetency to stand trial. Notably, among the six successful 
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primarily involved counsel’s failure to adequately investigate and present a mental health defense. 
One case involved counsel’s failure to investigate diminished capacity, a failure to contest the 
issue of competency, and ineffective counseling regarding the client’s previous plea agreement. 
Hoffman v. Arave, 455 F.3d 926, 932–42 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated in part, 552 U.S. 117 (2008). 
Two cases involved counsel’s failure to provide adequate assistance during the client’s competen-
cy determination. Hummel v. Rosemeyer, 564 F.3d 290, 301–02 (3d Cir. 2009); Deere v. Cullen, 
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request a diminished capacity defense. Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160, 1162 (9th Cir. 2002). 
Lastly, one case involved counsel’s failure to call a readily available and willing medical expert 
(forensic psychiatrist) whose testimony would be the centerpiece of a diminished capacity defense 
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In an overlapping subset of FTMP cases, including one non-death pen-
alty case,113 a number of courts addressed the failure of counsel to explain 
the role of mitigating circumstances and evidence to clients before those 
clients waived the right to present a case in mitigation.114 One of these cases 
involved an attorney advising a client to waive the right to a jury trial before 
sufficiently articulating the role of mitigating circumstances in a jury’s de-
termination of capital punishment.115 Another similar case concerned coun-
sel’s failure to fully clarify the definition and role of “mitigating circum-
stances” to the jury, resulting in prejudice to the client.116 
In more than half of the FTPM cases, courts expressly noted that coun-
sel were actually aware of the mitigating neuroscience evidence, but failed 
to adequately investigate that evidence.117 In the remaining cases, counsel 
were either not aware that the mitigating neuroscience evidence existed, or 
were aware of the evidence but did not recognize that it was mitigating.118 
Predictably, most defense counsel offered the court excuses for their 
deficient and prejudicial performance.119 The next Section will discuss the 
excuses that were provided in the seventy-four cases involving a successful 
neuroscience-related Strickland claim.120 Counsel often offered multiple 
excuses within the same case, so the categories presented in the next Sec-
tion are not mutually exclusive. They are nonetheless useful for providing a 
general sense of courts’ priorities when assessing Strickland claims. 
C. Why Counsel Omit or Mishandle Neuroscience 
In nearly one third of the seventy-four cases involving successful neu-
roscience-related Strickland claims, counsel claimed to have had a reasona-
ble trial strategy or tactic.121 Typically, counsel’s sole defense was that they 
were following a course of conduct during trial that they thought would 
succeed, and when it did not succeed, they were unprepared for the sentenc-
ing phase.122 For example, in Miller v. Dretke,123 counsel claimed he “did 
not prepare much for the punishment phase” because he believed his client 
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would accept the plea bargain of probation.124 Yet counsel admitted that he 
could have acquired her doctors’ letters before the trial’s punishment phase 
began, as well as interviewed the doctors before the trial and offered their 
testimony as mitigation evidence.125 Likewise, in Pirtle v. Morgan,126 trial 
counsel’s inexplicable decision to choose an intoxication instruction over a 
diminished capacity instruction to explain his client’s lack of premeditation 
left the jury “without any guidance as to the significance of the defense tes-
timony.”127 The court in Smith v. Mullin128 aptly depicted trial counsel’s 
flaws in just one sentence: “Astoundingly, [trial counsel] admitted at the 
evidentiary hearing that he was unaware Mr. Smith’s ‘mental state or mental 
illness could be introduced as mitigation in the second stage’ of trial.”129 
The court proceeded to find that Mr. Smith’s attorney therefore “made no 
attempt to explain how this kind and considerate person could commit such 
a horrendous crime, although mental health evidence providing such an ex-
planation was at his fingertips.”130 
In another category of excuses, counsel acknowledged ignorance in the 
mishandling of evidence or in communications with experts or clients.131 
These circumstances included counsel inappropriately accepting a client’s 
own portrayal of his mental status, relying on unqualified or insufficient 
numbers of experts to make decisions regarding a client’s defense, or erro-
neously believing that a client waived his right to present mitigating evi-
dence because counsel did not did not adequately investigate the client’s 
background or mental health issues.132 
Some cases involved attorneys who admitted their incompetence more 
straightforwardly. In Loyd v. Whitley,133 for example, trial counsel conceded 
that his inability to adequately investigate and present mitigation evidence 
“was based upon a failure to understand the difference between the 
McNaughten test for sanity and the Louisiana mitigating factors of ‘mental 
or emotional disturbance,’ or ‘mental disease or defect.’”134 In other cases, 
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counsel stated that the client either stopped cooperating with counsel’s in-
vestigation of potential mitigation evidence or counsel simply accepted a 
client’s waiver of mental health mitigation—explanations that courts found 
unacceptable.135 In Perkins v. Hall,136 for example, the court acknowledged 
evidence of the defendant’s “steadfast” resistance to being evaluated and “la-
beled [as] crazy” by experts, but concluded nonetheless that counsel was de-
ficient for insufficiently acquiring mitigation evidence from non-experts.137 
Such an alternative would involve more thoroughly investigating the de-
fendant’s background, information from family and friends, records of the 
defendant’s potential brain injury, and other methods of circumventing the 
defendant’s lack of cooperation.138 
A particularly troubling category of excuses involved the contention 
that counsel chose not to present certain mitigation evidence in an attempt 
to “humanize,” or conversely, “de-humanize” their clients because they 
thought such evidence could do their clients more harm than good.139 Three 
cases are especially representative. In Hurst v. State,140 the court rejected 
defense counsel’s erroneous contention that “any mitigation other than the 
fact that [the defendant] was a good person would have been inconsistent” 
with the defendant’s guilt-phase claim that he was innocent.141 As the court 
explained, counsel had “no sound basis” for failing “to investigate and pre-
sent mitigation evidence of [defendant’s] borderline intelligence . . . possi-
ble organic brain damage . . . and other mental mitigation.”142 Such evi-
dence was in no way harmful to defendant’s mitigation claim, nor did it car-
ry the potential to “open[] the door to any damaging testimony.”143 
Likewise, in Turpin v. Lipham,144 the court upheld a Strickland claim 
due to trial counsel’s failure to hire a medical expert for penalty-phase miti-
gation based on the erroneous and medically unsubstantiated belief that 
their client’s mental health records indicated both aggravating and mitigat-
ing factors.145 The attorneys were particularly concerned that they would 
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dehumanize their client and unleash potentially aggravating evidence if they 
enabled experts to interpret their client’s records for the jury.146 As the court 
explained, however, “[t]he jury, left unguided to comb through voluminous 
records, was just as likely to encounter aggravating information as mitigat-
ing information,” such as a nurse’s note that the defendant attacked another 
patient as compared to a caseworker’s memorandum explaining “the terrible 
neglect” that the client suffered at the hands of his parents.147 
Finally, in Simmons v. State,148 the court rejected the attorneys’ “hu-
manizing” justification for somewhat different reasons. In this case, alt-
hough counsel claimed to be tactically humanizing the defendant, the jury 
heard very little positive mitigation because of counsel’s failure to investi-
gate, uncover, and present it.149 Moreover, counsel provided no rationale to 
explain why aggravating evidence would have outweighed such mitigating 
evidence during the penalty phase150 
In essence, then, the courts in Hurst, Turpin, and Simmons rejected the 
argument that counsel’s failure to investigate or present mitigating infor-
mation constituted a “strategic decision.” The double-edged-sword argu-
ment is unpersuasive when counsel contends that neuroscience evidence 
can do more harm than good to clients. Courts plainly expect defense coun-
sel to use neuroscience evidence when appropriate, yet the precise parame-
ters of this expectation can be elusive. 
As indicated by the degree of overlap among the categories discussed 
in previous sections, Strickland cases involving neuroscience evidence are 
often highly complex, and they incorporate a wide range of circumstances. 
In Strickland claims, it is not always clear what type of neuroscience evi-
dence will be used, how the courts will handle that evidence, and finally, 
when and why the attorneys in these cases will be deemed ineffective. In an 
effort to address such questions, the next Section examines in more detail a 
selection of the Neuroscience Study’s seventy-four cases involving a suc-
cessful neuroscience-related Strickland claim. 
D. What Courts Expect from Attorneys Using Neuroscience 
This Section presents six case studies of opinions that represent the 
kinds of attorney failures that prompt courts to grant a neuroscience-related 
Strickland claim.151 As the case studies show, the decisions made by trial 
attorneys are egregious in terms of their omission and/or mishandling of 
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evidence and expert testimony, often with potentially “disastrous”152 or 
“devastating”153 results for their clients. Courts typically appear influenced 
not by just one mistake an attorney may have made but by many such mis-
takes which, when combined, throw doubt on counsel’s explanations that 
their decisions were “strategic.” As one court stresses, bad decisions are not 
strategy but rather inadequacy,154 and therefore just one edge of a sword. 
1. Investigate and Present Mitigating Evidence 
In the 2012 case of Simmons v. State,155 following the circuit court’s de-
nial of Simmons’s motion for post-conviction relief on Strickland grounds, 
the Supreme Court of Florida ultimately reversed and remanded the denial of 
relief as to the penalty phase. According to the court, Simmons’s counsel 
“failed to fully investigate and present mitigating evidence regarding Sim-
mons’s childhood and mental health.”156 Simmons’s trial counsel testified 
during an evidentiary hearing that, because she thought Simmons was compe-
tent, she never consulted a mental health expert on his behalf, nor did she in-
vestigate any other kind of mental mitigation.157 Thus, counsel presented no 
medical experts whatsoever to the jury during the penalty phase.158 
In sharp contrast, post-conviction defense counsel presented a range of 
medical testimony for the purposes of mitigation, including experts who 
tested Simmons during a post-conviction evidentiary hearing.159 Dr. H.D., 
for example, a psychologist and expert in neuropsychology, conducted sev-
eral non-imaging tests on Simmons including the WAIS-III and the Denman 
Neuropsychology Memory Scale to determine if Simmons had brain dam-
age.160 The results showed that Simmons fell in the borderline range of 
mental retardation.161 Other investigations revealed that Simmons had been 
placed in early programs for the severely emotionally disturbed—a status 
that ultimately fostered Simmons’s conflicts with other school children and 
led in part to Simmons eventually dropping out of school.162 Consequently, 
as an adult, Simmons experienced limited employability and maladjust-
ments in his workplace.163 After discovering that Simmons was accidentally 
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suffocated as an infant and only later revived at a hospital, Dr. H.D. recom-
mended a PET scan to further assess whether Simmons suffered brain dam-
age.164 The results validated Dr. H.D.’s view of Simmons’s cognitive im-
pairments, which, along with all of his earlier problems in school, fostered 
Simmons’s striking impulsivity and misbehavior—“a ‘sort of pervasive 
maladjustment.’”165 
According to Dr. H.D., Simmons also suffered from a personality dis-
order “that manifested in fear of rejection and abandonment, running away 
from home, affective instability, depression, extreme self-criticism, and so-
cial isolation.”166 Given Dr. H.D.’s assessment that alcohol and drugs more 
strongly affect brain damaged individuals, and that Simmons had continu-
ously consumed both alcohol and marijuana since a young age, Dr. H.D. 
rendered Simmons eligible for the statutory mitigator of “extreme mental or 
emotional disturbance.”167 Likewise, while Simmons “could appreciate the 
criminality of his conduct,” he “had an impaired capacity to conform his 
conduct to the requirements of law,” a classification that was also a statuto-
ry mitigator.168 
A second expert, Dr. F.W., a psychologist with training in neuropsychol-
ogy, provided testimony specific to Simmons’s PET scan results.169 Accord-
ing to Dr. F.W., Simmons’s PET scan abnormalities were so pronounced it 
was clear that “Simmons has real trouble understanding people and social 
contexts around him.”170 In addition, Simmons’s “underactive thalamus” 
could lead to a loss of control “because that portion of the brain is also in-
volved in stopping hazardous or inappropriate behavior.”171 Therefore, Dr. 
F.W. confirmed that Simmons’s PET scan results met the same criteria nec-
essary for the two statutory mitigators supported by Dr. H.D.’s testimony.172 
Yet post-conviction defense counsel also presented the testimony of a third 
expert—a psychotherapist and mitigation specialist—who concluded from 
her “psychosocial evaluation of Simmons” that “Simmons never developed 
the skills to live in the adult world.”173 
The court ultimately found in Simmons’s favor on the Strickland claim 
despite the State’s own medical expert rebutting defense counsel’s PET scan 
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evidence.174 The court recognized the “weighty aggravators” in Simmons’s 
case, but it also stressed the need to reverse for a new penalty phase in light 
of trial counsel’s extraordinary failure to investigate or present available 
mitigating evidence.175 In the court’s view, trial counsel had no reasonable 
“strategic decision;” the contrast in quality of representation between trial 
and post-conviction was just too great.176 In particular, Simmons’s “severe 
mental disturbance” was such a “weighty” mitigating factor that trial coun-
sel’s failure to present it in the penalty phase could have been prejudicial.177 
The court vacated Simmons’s death sentence.178 
2. Review Prior History and Testimony 
In Frierson v. Woodford,179 Frierson appealed for federal habeas corpus 
relief, alleging in his Strickland claim that his penalty phase counsel was inef-
fective for failing to investigate and present available mitigation evidence of 
several disorders: childhood head trauma, chronic drug abuse, mental im-
pairments, and organic brain damage.180 The court agreed that counsel’s con-
duct was deficient and prejudicial, emphasizing counsel’s failure to review 
evidence and testimony that was presented in earlier stages of the case.181 
Specifically, the court found that counsel never examined trial transcripts 
containing a drug history report prepared by Dr. R.S., a psychologist and 
pharmacologist.182 In his trial testimony, Dr. R.S. mentioned his report six 
times,183 stating that Frierson “was severely intoxicated with PCP” during 
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the commission of his crime, and that he likely suffered mental impairment 
from his chronic drug abuse.184 
Frierson’s attorney was also unaware of a report prepared by Dr. M.G., 
a forensic psychiatrist, who read his report into the record five times during 
trial testimony.185 In Dr. M.G.’s opinion, Frierson’s “PCP intoxication dur-
ing the crime prevented Frierson from deliberating, premeditating, and 
meaningfully reflecting on his actions,” as is required for a first-degree 
murder conviction.186 Had Frierson’s counsel reviewed the trial transcripts, 
he would have learned that Frierson underwent several psychiatric evalua-
tions while in custody of the California Youth Authority, including one ex-
plaining that Frierson exhibited symptoms of brain dysfunction.187 The 
court found that because counsel did not avail himself of this information 
and, in turn, give it to Dr. M.G., counsel had “‘failed to provide [his expert] 
with the information necessary to make an accurate evaluation of [Fri-
erson’s] neurological system.’”188 
Counsel contended that he purposely omitted evidence of Frierson’s 
past psychiatric evaluations in order to present Frierson in a positive light at 
the penalty hearing, and to avoid evidence of his antisocial personality dis-
order.189 As counsel explained, “such evidence would only have helped the 
prosecution’s case by showing Mr. Frierson to be unredeemable and without 
remorse, and would thus have undermined my efforts to humanize 
[him].”190 The court strongly rejected this excuse, holding that counsel’s 
decision clearly reflected not strategy, but rather inadequacy, and was there-
fore deficient.191 
3. Properly Handle Evidence and Experts 
In Hooper v. Mullin,192 Hooper sought federal habeas relief after he 
was convicted of three murders in state court and sentenced to death.193 
Hooper raised a Strickland claim at the sentencing phase, alleging that his 
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attorneys mishandled mitigating psychological evidence.194 On habeas re-
view, the court agreed with Hooper, granting him relief from his death sen-
tence.195 
Before Hooper committed his crimes, he received counseling from Dr. 
R.A., who administered several non-imaging neuropsychological tests to 
ascertain Hooper’s intellectual functioning.196 Dr. R.A. reported that Hoop-
er’s cognitive functioning and intelligence were average, but that he may be 
learning disabled because of his challenges with spelling.197 The test results 
also demonstrated that Hooper had psychological problems, including his 
“difficulty controlling his anger and coping with everyday problems.”198 
After Hooper committed his crimes but prior to his conviction, his at-
torneys hired a psychologist, Dr. P.M., who reviewed Dr. R.A.’s report on 
Hooper.199 Without conducting his own evaluation of Hooper, Dr. P.M. then 
submitted a report indicating that “there was evidence of ‘mild but probable 
brain damage’ that could increase the likelihood of violence, especially if 
[Hooper] was under the influence of alcohol or other substances.”200 Dr. 
P.M. also reported that Hooper might be suffering from a “serious psychiat-
ric thought disorder.”201 After Hooper’s conviction, Dr. P.M. refused, for 
ethical reasons, the attorneys’ request that he testify at the sentencing pro-
ceedings, explaining that he had never personally examined Hooper.202 Dr. 
P.M. also warned that his comments about Hooper “likely would be aggra-
vating rather than mitigating.”203 
Regardless, Hooper’s attorneys subpoenaed Dr. P.M. to authenticate 
his report so that both Dr. P.M.’s and Dr. R.A.’s reports could be admitted 
into evidence at the capital sentencing phase.204 Predictably, however, Dr. 
P.M. informed the jury that “he did not put ‘enormous stock’ in his conclu-
sions because he did not personally evaluate [Hooper].”205 Dr. P.M. also 
stated that Dr. R.A. was the better expert to address Hooper’s alleged brain 
damage because Dr. R.A. had evaluated Hooper in person.206 The State 
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called Dr. R.A. in rebuttal, and Dr. R.A. testified that Hooper “had a mild 
learning disability, but no brain damage.”207 In addition, while Hooper had 
some psychological problems, “those problems would not cause him to lose 
touch with reality or make him incapable of controlling himself or his an-
ger.”208 
Such contradictions in the testimony of both experts moved the court 
to grant Hooper’s Strickland claim.209 Neither expert had provided “any 
mitigating evidence” for Hooper “and their combined testimony was disas-
trous for [his] defense.”210 As the court explained, “[t]he jury was left with 
unchallenged expert opinions that [Hooper] did not suffer from brain dam-
age, had no particular trouble controlling his temper, and that his learning 
disability would not have affected his capacity for violence or ability to rea-
son in adverse circumstances.”211 
The court’s analysis of Strickland’s deficiency prong212 focused on 
whether the attorneys’ presentation of the evidence was part of a “reasona-
ble trial strategy” or “the product of ‘neglectful’ or otherwise erroneous rep-
resentation.”213 While their penalty phase strategy was to present evidence 
indicating that Hooper may have had brain damage that could lead to vio-
lence, in reality, defense counsel followed a course devoid of investiga-
tion.214 
Hooper’s attorneys claimed that they intentionally chose not to have 
Dr. P.M. further evaluate Hooper out of concern that the results would do 
more harm than good; in other words, a more thorough assessment could 
show that Hooper had no brain damage.215 Instead, by using Dr. P.M.’s re-
port that Hooper “might have brain damage,” they could still press for miti-
gation on Hooper’s behalf, despite acknowledging that additional psycho-
logical testing could have provided more definitive mitigating prognoses.216 
The court was unconvinced; even if counsel considered their rationale to be 
a “strategic decision,” they still presented the evidence they had “in an un-
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prepared and ill-informed manner.”217 The court thus affirmed Hooper’s 
petition for habeas relief from his death sentence.218 
4. Distinguish Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances 
In Waters v. Zant,219 Waters had been convicted of capital murder in 
state court and sentenced to death.220 He appealed a district court’s denial of 
his habeas corpus petition, which was grounded in part on a Strickland 
claim.221 The appellate court affirmed Waters’s conviction, but granted him 
a writ of habeas corpus as to the death penalty because of his attorney’s in-
effective assistance at the sentencing phase of trial.222 
As the court explained, Waters’s attorney never informed the jury “of 
the role of aggravating and mitigating circumstances” even though Waters 
suffered from a mental illness that was a clear mitigating circumstance.223 
Not only did the attorney fail to acquire mitigating evidence from medical 
experts concerning Waters’s mental abnormalities,224 he inexplicably omit-
ted the mental illness testimony that he had introduced in an earlier effort to 
prove the insanity defense at trial.225 Waters had twice attempted suicide 
and had been diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia, an illness typically 
accompanied by delusions and hallucinations.226 He had also been treated 
with an antipsychotic drug prescribed to diffuse his “feelings of anger and 
hostility,” but he had stopped taking the drug a few weeks prior to his 
crimes.227 
Furthermore, testimony at Waters’s state habeas proceeding revealed 
that Waters’s medical experts “had no idea” that counsel expected them to 
offer mitigating evidence at the guilt-innocence phase.228 The court noted, 
for example, that counsel failed to elicit one expert psychologist’s opinion 
that Waters’s mental illness would have influenced his behavior on the day 
he committed his crimes, or that he also could have been hallucinating that 
day in light of his mental condition.229 Such evidence may have at least “of-
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fered the jury an alternative” to what the court found to be counsel’s most 
deficient performance: eliciting damaging testimony from his own defense 
witnesses, while failing to draw upon their readily available favorable tes-
timony.230 
As the court stated, counsel “presented evidence that was not only very 
harmful but was devastating to his client’s plea for life.”231 Furthermore, 
counsel introduced experts “who never should have been a part of the de-
fense case,” including psychiatrist Dr. H.D., whose “entire testimony was 
harmful to Waters.”232 Dr. H.D. testified that Waters only suffered from 
“anxiety neurosis, not paranoid schizophrenia,” and additionally that Waters 
was “in good contact with reality.”233 As the court explained, counsel’s han-
dling of Dr. H.D.’s harmful testimony was particularly detrimental to Wa-
ters because it was elicited by counsel himself on direct examination, not by 
the prosecution during cross-examination.234 In addition, counsel was so 
unprepared that he had “no idea” what Dr. H.D. would say on the stand.235 
Counsel’s elicited testimony from another expert witness was equally 
troublesome, suggesting first that Waters’s mental illness had no bearing on 
his commission of the crime,236 and then, “[w]ith a persistence that resem-
bled that of a prosecutor” drawing forth testimony that “Waters attacked his 
victims to fulfill his sexual desire.”237 Most stunningly, the expert witness 
attempted to prevent counsel from extracting such detrimental information, 
but without success.238 According to the expert’s post-conviction affidavit 
about his experience, counsel had never informed him that he would be tes-
tifying for Waters at the penalty phase.239 Had the expert known this, his 
testimony would have been favorable.240 He explained that Waters suffered 
from a “schizophrenic disorder” that provided substantial grounds for miti-
gation.241 
According to the court, counsel “totally failed” to effectively handle 
the paltry mitigating evidence he did decide to present.242 He also neglected 
to explain to the jury why Waters’s mental illness could be a mitigating fac-
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 232 Id. at 1494–95. 
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tor.243 The court emphasized ample precedent indicating that counsel’s per-
formance was without question constitutionally deficient.244 
5. Research Early Childhood Disorders 
In Stankewitz v. Wong,245 the court ultimately vacated Stankewitz’s 
death sentence and ordered a re-sentence of life without the possibility of 
parole.246 According to Stankewitz’s Strickland claim, his penalty phase 
attorney not only performed deficiently but also prejudiced Stankewitz with 
a skeletal investigation and presentation of mitigation evidence that failed to 
address aggravating factors.247 
In particular, Stankewitz claimed that counsel failed to sufficiently in-
vestigate and present evidence of his “impaired intellectual functioning and 
brain damage,”248 which was thoroughly documented by three medical ex-
perts who agreed that he suffered from brain injuries as well as a history of 
mental illness.249 According to one of the experts, Stankewitz was border-
line mentally retarded and evinced “significant brain dysfunction, perhaps 
attributable to Fetal Alcohol Syndrome and childhood abuse.”250 Another 
expert testified that Stankewitz’s brain damage “would produce problems 
with emotional control, tendencies to be impulsive and unpredictable, and 
to be unable to exercise adequate judgment or to understand the conse-
quences of his behavior.”251 Moreover, Stankewitz had been diagnosed with 
antisocial personality disorder and evidenced neurologic abnormalities 
based on the results of two EEG tests.252 Some of the strongest testimony 
came from the doctor who administered the first EEG test and a psychiatric 
evaluation when Stankewitz was age twelve.253 At that early age Stankewitz 
already exhibited “sudden loss of control;” in addition he “becomes abu-
sive, uses vile language, [is] combative, [and demonstrates] ample evidence 
of neurotic disturbance (bitten fingernails and bed-wetting).”254 Given that 
all of this mitigation evidence was available at the penalty phase and much 
                                                                                                                           
 243 Id. 
 244 Id. at 1492–94. 
 245 659 F. Supp. 2d 1103 (E.D. Cal. 2009). 
 246 Id. at 1112. 
 247 Id. at 1105; see also Wallace v. Stewart, 184 F.3d 1112, 1116 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Does an 
attorney have a professional responsibility to investigate and bring to the attention of mental 
health experts who are examining his client, facts that the experts do not request? The answer, at 
least at the sentencing phase of a capital case, is yes.”). 
 248 Stankewitz, 659 F. Supp. 2d at 1106. 
 249 Id. at 1109. 
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 251 Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
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 254 Id. at 1113 (citing in Appendix A the May 6, 1970 psychological evaluation with Dr. Z). 
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of it was officially documented, counsel’s choice to exclude it was “unrea-
sonable” and prejudicial.255 
6. Evaluate Mental Health and Drug Abuse 
In James v. Ryan,256 petitioner James, convicted of capital murder and 
sentenced to death, appealed a district court’s denial of his habeas corpus 
petition.257 The court affirmed his petition for habeas relief from his death 
sentence,258 citing counsel’s “complete failure to investigate and present 
mitigating evidence of James’s troubled childhood, his mental illness, and 
his history of chronic drug abuse.”259 The court held that this deficiency 
prejudiced James because his troubled history was relevant to the sentenc-
ing judge’s assessment of James’s moral culpability.260 
In particular, the court found that counsel did not conduct even the 
most elementary research on James’s background.261 The court noted that a 
minimal investigation would have uncovered “obvious indications that 
James had suffered emotional and psychological trauma during his child-
hood,”262 including a pretrial competency report that labeled James’s early 
years as “disturbed.”263 This label was reinforced by evidence that James’s 
father was a drug addict who was incarcerated during James’s youth, as 
well as documentation that James’s mother offered him into foster care be-
fore he reached the age of three.264 Counsel also failed to gather accessible 
documentation of James’s educational history, which would have revealed 
his “subaverage academic and intellectual functioning, as well as his behav-
ioral and social problems.”265 
Furthermore, counsel did not sufficiently study James’s mental health, 
which should be a key focus in any investigation of a defendant’s back-
ground for mitigation purposes.266 The competency reports of two doctors 
noted that James had a history of suicide attempts, some of which included 
crashing cars at high speeds.267 Counsel knew that James took lithium and 
                                                                                                                           
 255 Id. at 1112 (“[T]here was a reasonable probability that the jury would not have sentenced 
Stankewitz to death had it been presented with the evidence of the numerous deprivations and 
abuses Stankewitz alleges that he suffered.” (citation and internal quotations omitted)). 
 256 679 F.3d 780, 784–85 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 1579 (2013). 
 257 Id. at 785. 
 258 Id. at 820. 
 259 Id. at 786. 
 260 Id. 
 261 Id. at 786, 807. 
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had undergone psychiatric care,268 and was therefore aware of the need to 
investigate. 
Finally, the court noted that counsel failed to investigate James’s drug 
abuse trajectory, a requirement reinforced by case precedent stressing this 
“well-established” part of mitigation research.269 The court again observed 
that there were obvious signs of James’s history of polysubstance abuse of a 
wide range of drugs,270 including marijuana, cocaine, and LSD.271 Moreo-
ver, despite counsel’s mitigating argument for diminished capacity based on 
James’s LSD intoxication, counsel “failed to appreciate that chronic drug 
abuse itself evinces, as well as exacerbates, serious mental illness.”272 
In sum, although there are common themes that resonate among the 
ineffective assistance of counsel cases involving neuroscience evidence,273 
the particularized nature of the evidence and the circumstances in which it 
is used also invite case studies. Each case study evokes its own double-
edged-sword analysis, but the shared message from the courts is this: it is 
critical for attorneys to fully investigate and present mitigation evidence, 
particularly in death penalty cases.274 Neuroscience—in all of its many fac-
ets—is an important component of mitigation.  
The next Part, however, deals with neuroscience cases that go to the 
crux of the double-edged-sword analysis, specifically those situations in 
which neuroscience is used not for purposes of mitigation but rather to sug-
gest or validate a defendant’s future dangerousness.275 Given the emphasis 
courts place on mitigation, attorneys must also be aware of the flip side of 
what neuroscience can bring to the courtroom. 
                                                                                                                           
 268 Id. at 808–09. The court quoted the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, stating: 
[W]here “counsel was aware that [the defendant] tried to commit suicide in prison 
. . . and that he was taking anti-depressant medication at the time of trial,” counsel 
“should have retained a mental health expert and provided the expert with the in-
formation needed to form an accurate profile of [the defendant’s] mental health.” 
Id. (quoting Hamilton v. Ayers, 583 F.3d 1110, 1117 (9th Cir. 2009)).  
 269 Id. at 809. 
 270 Id. 
 271 Id. Particularly relevant on this point was an expert’s opinion that James’s alleged use of 
LSD at the time of the murder “‘may have’ compromised James’s capacity to appreciate the 
wrongfulness of his conduct.” Id. at 795. 
 272 Id. at 809. 
 273 See supra notes 155–272 and accompanying text (exploring six shared themes of ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel cases). 
 274 See James, 679 F.3d at 786; Frierson, 463 F.3d at 989; Hooper, 314 F.3d at 1170; 
Stankewitz, 659 F. Supp. 2d at 1106; Simmons, 105 So. 3d at 483. 
 275 See infra notes 276–448 and accompanying text. 
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III. NEUROSCIENCE AND FUTURE DANGEROUSNESS 
The majority of death penalty states consider a defendant’s potential 
for future dangerousness to be an aggravating factor worthy of considera-
tion during the penalty phase of a capital trial.276 Indeed, the concept of fu-
ture dangerousness has garnered substantial attention in recent years.277 A 
major concern is that prosecutors will seek the death penalty based on neu-
roscience evidence indicating that a defendant is likely to commit future 
crimes278—just as some of the mitigating factors in Strickland cases can be 
translated into aggravating factors if defense attorneys are not sufficiently 
prepared or careful.279 Yet the Neuroscience Study found minimal support 
for this concern. In those rare instances when prosecutors did utilize neuro-
science evidence to suggest a defendant’s propensity to commit crimes, they 
typically did so only by building upon the evidence first introduced by a 
defense expert.280  
In contrast, some defense attorneys decided to omit potentially mitigat-
ing evidence because they thought it may bolster the perception of a client’s 
future dangerousness.281 Such tactics are controversial, as demonstrated by 
this Article’s discussion of the Strickland claim cases. As one judge voiced 
in a future dangerousness case, “we cannot insulate an unreasonable tactic 
not to present mitigating evidence by labeling it a two-edged sword.”282 
Nonetheless, this Part shows that, for a range of reasons, cases involving 
neuroscience and future dangerousness typically do not evoke successful 
                                                                                                                           
 276 See Mitzi Dorland & Daniel Krauss, The Danger of Dangerousness in Capital Sentencing: 
Exacerbating the Problem of Arbitrary and Capricious Decision-Making, 29 LAW & PSYCHOL. 
REV. 63, 64 (2005). The U.S. Supreme Court has also given prosecutors free reign to use this 
evidence. See Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 165 n.5 (1994) (“The State is free to 
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bilitation.” Dorland & Krauss, supra, at 64–65. 
 277 See infra notes 286–448 and accompanying text. 
 278 See Snead, supra note 7, at 1318–38. 
 279 See supra notes 219–244 and accompanying text. 
 280 See infra notes 328–353 and accompanying text. 
 281 See infra notes 304–325 and accompanying text. 
 282 Bryan v. Mullin, 335 F.3d 1207, 1225 (10th Cir. 2003) (Henry, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part).  
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Strickland claims.283 Section A begins with an overview of the Neurosci-
ence Study’s future dangerousness cases,284 and Section B examines the 
trends, themes, and controversies among them.285  
A. How Cases Involve Neuroscience 
Among the Neuroscience Study’s 553 Defendant Cases, only 80 cases 
(14.47%) feature any discussion of future dangerousness related to the de-
fendant, as Chart 7 shows.286 Most of this discussion did not involve neuro-
science evidence, but instead relied upon other kinds of evidence or testi-
mony, such as a warden’s personal assessment of the defendant’s behavior 
as an inmate.287 Indeed, as Chart 7 indicates, only 39 cases featured a dis-
cussion of future dangerousness that was driven, even in part, by an exami-
nation of neuroscience evidence (7.05% of the 553 Defendant Cases and 
48.75% of the 80 future dangerousness cases). 
Of these 39 cases, 14 cases—all of which were capital murder cases—
featured a discussion of neuroscience that was intended to establish the fu-
ture dangerousness of the defendant.288 In addition, three of those fourteen 
cases contain references to future dangerousness that are only indirect or 
implied, rather than explicit.289 In yet another case, the court upheld the 
                                                                                                                           
 283 See infra notes 284–448 and accompanying text. At the same time, the Neuroscience 
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 285 See infra notes 297–325 and accompanying text. 
 286 See infra Chart 7; Stat. App., supra note 38; DENNO, supra note 38. 
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 288 See Bryan, 335 F.3d at 1243; Wesbrook v. Thaler, 585 F.3d 245, 255 (5th Cir. 2009); Smith 
v. Workman, 550 F.3d 1258, 1266 (10th Cir. 2008); Lorraine v. Coyle, 291 F.3d 416, 424 (6th Cir. 
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Fleenor v. Farley, 47 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1066 (S.D. Ind. 1998), aff’d, 171 F.3d 1096 (7th Cir. 1999); 
State v. Ross, 646 A.2d 1318, 1368 (Conn. 1994); Gudinas v. State, 816 So. 2d 1095, 1103–04 (Fla. 
2002); People v. Peeples, 793 N.E.2d 641, 682 (Ill. 2002); Commonwealth v. Stevens, 739 A.2d 507, 
528 (Pa. 1999); Coe v. State, 17 S.W.3d 193, 243 (Tenn. 2000), abrogated by State v. Irick, 320 
S.W.3d 284 (Tenn. 2010); Ex parte Lucas, 877 S.W.2d 315, 323 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). 
 289 See Lorraine, 291 F.3d at 425; Gudinas, 816 So. 2d at 1104; Coe, 17 S.W.3d at 243. Three 
cases involved future dangerousness references that were only implied or inferred in the record, as 
opposed to being explicitly referenced as part of the defendant’s case. In two of these cases, refer-
ences to the defendant’s “future dangerousness” derived from expert medical testimony that was 
unrelated to an explicit discussion of the actual statutory aggravator of future dangerousness. In 
the first of these two cases, Coe v. State, the State’s expert witness testified that Coe “possibly 
could become psychotic in the future.” 17 S.W.3d. at 243. This testimony, however, was only 
offered to demonstrate that at the relevant period of time, Coe was in fact competent to be execut-
ed. Id. at 248. In the second of these two cases, Gudinas v. State, the only mention of future dan-
gerousness appeared during the court’s review of the defendant’s Strickland claim regarding coun-
sel’s alleged failure to adequately present mitigation evidence during the penalty phase. 816 So. 
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Strickland claim concerning future dangerousness, thereby whittling the 
total number of successful uses by prosecutors of such evidence to just 
ten.290 The Neuroscience Study’s findings thus suggest that overall there is 
little likelihood that neuroscience evidence introduced by the defense will 
be leveraged by the prosecution in an effort to prove the defendant’s future 
dangerousness. 
As Chart 7 shows,291 a Strickland claim was raised in conjunction with 
future dangerousness in 33 of the 80 cases (41.25%), and the fourteen future 
dangerousness cases based on neuroscience evidence only rarely evoked a 
successful Strickland claim. Fourteen cases constitute a small sample, how-
ever, and future dangerousness circumstances differ from those cases in-
volving typical Strickland claims. It is therefore difficult to make generali-
zations or reach broad conclusions linking future dangerousness arguments 
to the use of neuroscience evidence in criminal law cases. 
One major difference with future dangerousness cases, for example, 
concerns the protections afforded to defendants through what is known as 
the Simmons jury instruction.292 The U.S. Supreme Court’s 1994 ruling in 
Simmons v. South Carolina293 stipulates that if a prosecutor in a capital case 
raises concerns regarding a defendant’s future dangerousness, the jury must 
be instructed that life in prison is equivalent to life without the possibility of 
parole.294 Thus, the purpose of a Simmons instruction is to diminish the pos-
sibility that a jury will award a defendant the death penalty simply because 
of the jury’s concern that a defendant could be a future danger if that de-
fendant is no longer incarcerated.295 As Chart 7 shows, a Simmons instruc-
tion was mentioned in 17 of the 80 cases (21.25%) that addressed future 
dangerousness. 
                                                                                                                           
2d at 1103–04. According to the defense expert’s testimony, Gudinas’s psychological and emo-
tional impairments suggested that he “would probably be a danger to others in the future unless he 
was properly treated and that [his crime] was consistent with the behavior of a person with his 
psychological makeup.” Id. This testimony, however, was only presented in an attempt to intro-
duce the mental health mitigator of extreme emotional disturbance. Id. at 1106. Notably, trial 
counsel testified that their strategy was to “humanize” their client and present him to the jury not 
as a monster, but as a person who can be rehabilitated. Id. In the third case, Lorraine v. Coyle, the 
only mention of future dangerousness appeared in a footnote that referenced only a portion of the 
myriad Strickland claims asserted by the defendant. 291 F.3d at 424 n.4. Specifically, Lorraine 
alleged that “[t]rial counsel failed to object to the State’s argument inferring, improperly, future 
dangerousness, by calling the Petitioner a ‘psychopath’ in closing argument.” Id. The court found 
that this claim was procedurally defaulted and did not address its merits. Id. 
 290 See infra notes 297–301 and accompanying text. 
 291 See infra Chart 7. 
 292 Simmons, 512 U.S. at 171. 
 293 Id. at 154. 
 294 Id. at 177 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 295 Id. at 178 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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The Neuroscience Study therefore found a limited number of cases 
linking the concept of future dangerousness to neuroscience; but those few 
cases are intricate and important for a criminal justice system preparing to 
accommodate an influx of innovative brain technology and prediction re-
search.296 Thus, it is critical to understand the kinds of arguments attorneys 
raise and the ways courts respond, especially because it becomes clear that 
defense attorneys can avoid the threat of potential future dangerousness ar-
guments by preparing and remaining in control of their experts’ testimony. 
B. The Specter of the Double-Edged Sword 
Among the fourteen future dangerousness cases involving neurosci-
ence evidence, several themes emerge. First, in all but one of the cases, the 
court affirmed the defendant’s death sentence.297 In that case, State v. 
Ross,298 Ross claimed that the court committed harmful error by allowing, 
over objection, the State to cross-examine a defense psychiatric expert 
about Ross’s potential for future danger if he were released from prison.299 
The court agreed with Ross’s contention that such a cross-examination re-
garding future dangerousness was outside the scope of what the State was 
procedurally allowed to rebut relating to his mitigation case.300 The court 
ultimately affirmed Ross’s convictions, but it reversed and remanded his 
death sentence, reasoning that the lower court committed the harmful er-
ror.301 
Judicial considerations of future dangerousness vary widely in the re-
maining thirteen cases, in which the courts affirmed death sentences. Gen-
erally, however, the attorneys involved in these thirteen cases demonstrate 
far less egregious behavior than the attorneys involved in the Strickland 
claim cases discussed in Part II.302 Neuroscience evidence most commonly 
appeared when a court was evaluating a Strickland claim based on trial 
counsel’s failure to fully develop that evidence—but courts consistently 
rejected defendants’ Strickland claims in this context.303 Instead, courts fa-
                                                                                                                           
 296 See infra notes 327–448 and accompanying text (discussing the limited case law on the 
effect of neuroscience on future dangerousness findings and the importance of the continued use 
of such evidence). 
 297 See Ross, 646 A.2d at 1368 (reversing a death sentence); see also supra notes 288–290 and 
accompanying text (discussing the remaining thirteen cases). 
 298 646 A.2d at 1318. 
 299 Id. at 1368. 
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 302 See supra notes 155–272 and accompanying text. 
 303 See infra notes 305–448 and accompanying text. 
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vored a finding of reasonable trial strategy across a variety of purported 
strategies.304 In several cases, the court noted that it was objectively reason-
able for counsel not to present certain neuroscience evidence due to the po-
tentially dual nature of the evidence in capital cases as both mitigating and 
aggravating.305 
A number of these thirteen cases referred to neuroscience mitigation 
evidence as a double-edged sword for this reason.306 In Bryan v. Mullin,307 
for example, counsel explained why he excluded the mitigating opinions of 
two mental health experts who had diagnosed his client as severely psycho-
logically impaired, or crazy, but not insane.308 Counsel’s concern was that 
because his client seemingly had the capacity to form intent, testimony con-
cerning his client’s mental abnormalities would suggest he “was a danger to 
society.”309 As the dissent in Bryan noted, the majority defended counsel’s 
decision because, “[g]iven the other evidence of violent behavior, the jury 
could have thought this type of psychological problem indicated a propensi-
ty for future violence.”310 
Likewise, in Ex parte Lucas,311 the court noted that Lucas’s mental 
impairment, including schizophrenia and continuing psychological trauma 
from his abusive childhood, exemplified “evidence which both militates for 
and against the death penalty,” and therefore supported counsel’s decision to 
omit Lucas’s mental health background.312 In Maldonado v. Thaler,313 Mal-
donado argued that trial counsel failed to present his mental retardation as 
mitigation in his capital case.314 Yet the court rejected Maldonado’s argu-
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 305 See Bryan, 335 F.3d at 1239 (Henry, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Smith, 
550 F.3d at 1265; Maldonado, 662 F. Supp. 2d at 752; Dowthitt, 180 F. Supp. 2d at 861; Peeples, 
793 N.E.2d at 680; Ex parte Lucas, 877 S.W.2d at 324. 
 306 See Bryan, 335 F.3d at 1239 (“[Counsel’s] choice not to present the mental health history 
at the sentencing stage was reasonable, given his fear of the evidence acting as a two-edged 
sword.”); Ex parte Lucas, 877 S.W.2d at 324 (“[A]pplicant may have been less culpable based 
upon his emotional and mental problems . . . . [However] such evidence was a two-edged sword in 
that it might diminish applicant’s blameworthiness for his crime even as it indicates that there is a 
probability that he will be dangerous in the future.”). 
 307 335 F.3d at 1207 (majority opinion). 
 308 Id. at 1218. 
 309 Id. at 1231 (Henry, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 310 Id. at 1243; see also Peeples, 793 N.E.2d at 659 (holding that evidence of frontal lobe 
damage resulting in poor decision making, irrational behavior, as well as a history of psychologi-
cal impairment including a quick and violent temper, may “‘tend to show the court that [defend-
ant] is, in fact, dangerous,’ as well as ‘his capacity for future conduct,’” as opposed to mitigating 
future dangerousness). 
 311 877 S.W.2d at 315. 
 312 See id. at 319 (internal quotations omitted). 
 313 662 F. Supp. 2d at 684. 
 314 Id. at 752. 
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ment, quoting Atkins v. Virginia315 as support:316 “reliance on mental retar-
dation as a mitigating factor can be a two-edged sword that may enhance 
the likelihood that the aggravating factor of future dangerousness will be 
found by the jury.”317 Thus, counsel’s omission of mental retardation evi-
dence as a basis for mitigation “can be reasonable in order to prevent a neg-
ative jury finding on issue of future dangerousness.”318 
In two cases, the courts praised attorneys for presenting evidence of 
mental illness even though defendants in both cases expressly requested that 
counsel not present such evidence.319 In Bryan,320 for example, the court 
held that trial counsel had used an acceptable strategy when introducing 
evidence of mental illness, despite being forbidden by his client from men-
tioning any such evidence and being informed that his client would not ac-
cept a guilty plea—even to avoid a death sentence.321 Similarly, in Dowthitt 
v. Johnson,322 Dowthitt not only consistently denied having a history of 
mental illness, but also showed no symptoms of mental or emotional disor-
ders.323 His attorney nonetheless retained a psychiatrist to examine 
Dowthitt, but the psychiatrist advised counsel not to have him testify on 
Dowthitt’s behalf given the psychiatrist’s own conflicting views of 
Dowthitt’s future dangerousness.324 The court upheld as reasonable coun-
sel’s compliance with this request.325 
It is clear, therefore, that the theme of the double-edged sword in fu-
ture dangerousness cases is pervasive. An analysis of particular cases fur-
ther demonstrates how this theme resonates. The next Section closely ana-
lyzes the details of such cases given their relevance to the future use of neu-
roscience technology in court.326 
C. How Cases Involve Dangerousness 
This Section examines five particularly insightful future dangerousness 
cases, focusing specifically on how courts view future dangerousness in the 
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context of a double-edged-sword analysis.327 These cases illustrate the 
murky line between what courts do and do not consider acceptable. 
1. Unanticipated Expert Testimony 
In Fleenor v. Farley,328 Fleenor petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus 
following the court’s affirmance of his murder conviction and death sen-
tence.329 Fleenor primarily contended that his attorneys mishandled availa-
ble neuroscience evidence and arguments during the penalty phase.330 
Fleenor’s attorneys attempted to show at the penalty phase that Fleenor was 
mentally abnormal and that his crimes were attributable to his mental ill-
ness, extreme mental or emotional disturbance, and/or the consequences of 
his intoxication from alcohol.331 Yet, under cross-examination, the prosecu-
tion attempted to undercut much of this evidence.332 Particularly damaging 
to Fleenor was the testimony provided by two experts—Dr. G.B., a court-
appointed psychiatrist, and Dr. P.C., a psychologist that defense counsel 
chose.333 During the prosecutor’s cross examination of Dr. G.B., for exam-
ple, Dr. G.B. stated that “if given the chance in the future, Fleenor would 
‘continue to involve himself in similar behavior in the future,’”—an opinion 
that the prosecutor then stressed and repeated to the jury.334 Dr. P.C. also 
provided dangerousness projections about Fleenor’s behavior.335 In his 
view, “Fleenor was ‘not psychotic’ but that, under extreme stress, someone 
with borderline personality disorder [like Fleenor] [could] exhibit psychotic 
symptoms.”336 Fleenor’s attorneys referred to this characterization of 
Fleenor as a “transient psychotic episode,” but on cross-examination Dr. 
P.C. bolstered the prosecution’s case with the following statements: 
“Fleenor was not psychotic and not insane, but mentally ill,” and Fleenor’s 
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personality disorder was a long term condition that would be “‘quite re-
sistant to treatment.’”337 
Taken together, the testimony from both experts fueled the prosecu-
tor’s assessment of Fleenor’s likely future violence, especially during his 
closing argument.338 According to Fleenor, however, the prosecutor had 
engaged in misconduct during his closing argument by offering an expert’s 
opinion to the jury, which violated Fleenor’s Sixth Amendment rights.339 In 
particular, Fleenor argued that although he and his attorneys knew that Dr. 
G.B. would be evaluating Fleenor’s sanity and competency to stand trial, 
they had no idea that he would also contribute testimony during trial regard-
ing Fleenor’s future dangerousness.340 In rejecting Fleenor’s claims and af-
firming his death sentence, the court ultimately explained that, given the 
type of testimony offered, counsel was aware that “the nature of any mental 
disorder or behavioral problem would be explored in detail, including any 
persistent and continuing patterns of violent conduct.”341 Likewise, it was 
not “unreasonable or unfair” for the prosecution to attempt to rebut expert 
testimony that Fleenor’s antisocial personality disorder could be controlled, 
especially because the defense set forth mental health and other mitigating 
evidence at the penalty phase.342 
That said, in multiple ways the prosecutor’s closing argument demon-
strated the effects of the future dangerousness testimony and the double-
edged nature of the mental illness testimony presented in this case.343 Refer-
ring to Fleenor as an “‘animal’” and repeatedly as “‘the enemy,’” the prose-
cutor continuously stressed the “right” and need for individuals to “protect” 
themselves from “‘people who kill and kill again.’”344 The prosecutor also 
emphasized the obligation to protect “‘the prison guards that have to deal 
with this man,’” as well as the “‘jail dispatchers’” and the “‘people in this 
[court]room.’”345 By declining this call to defend, the prosecutor argued, 
society will have “‘lost its ability to stand up against the blackness and 
against the enemy.’”346 
Other factors also worked against Fleenor’s efforts either to raise a 
Strickland claim or to highlight the potential impact of future dangerousness 
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testimony.347 In contrast to Part II’s accounts of attorney deficiencies,348 for 
example, the court ultimately rejected Fleenor’s ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims.349 Not only had Fleenor’s attorneys devoted more than 1000 
hours of time both before and during Fleenor’s trial, the court had also 
characterized them as “two skilled, experienced, and tenacious lawyers who 
fought to save [Fleenor’s] life.”350 Thus, counsel’s representation of Fleenor 
at both the guilt and penalty phases of trial was well above the constitution-
al floor set in Strickland.351 
Indeed, as the remaining case studies indicate, attorneys in these future 
dangerousness cases are relatively more prepared and professional than the 
attorneys discussed in Part II’s Strickland claim cases.352 As a result, a de-
fendant-petitioner’s challenges against future dangerousness arguments can 
lose steam when attorneys are otherwise covering their legal bases. That 
said, as the dissent in the following case study compellingly argues, not 
everyone agrees that these attorneys are providing effective representa-
tion.353 
2. The Slide From Mitigation to Danger 
In Bryan,354 Bryan appealed a district court decision denying his peti-
tion for habeas relief from his conviction of first-degree murder and at-
tendant death sentence.355 Bryan contended in his Strickland claim that his 
attorney failed to present available evidence of Bryan’s mental impairment 
and that Bryan was therefore prejudiced.356 The court ultimately rejected 
Bryan’s claim,357 but on appeal Bryan offered a vast range of evidence re-
garding his alleged mental abnormalities.358 These included “organic brain 
disease” potentially linked to “his severe case of diabetes mellitus,”359 a 
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“delusional system and circumstantiality of thought,”360 as well as a “seri-
ous mental disorder.”361 Indeed, Bryan’s Strickland claim contended that 
counsel failed to present this evidence or any other mental health evidence 
on his behalf.362 Contrary to Fleenor, then, the issue in Bryan was one of 
counsel choosing to omit evidence rather than counsel insufficiently antici-
pating the content of testimony already admitted into court.363 
Counsel contended, however, that he had limited options during Bry-
an’s guilt phase, a position the court seemingly took to heart.364 For exam-
ple, the court concluded that Bryan’s counsel lacked the medical evidence 
necessary to adequately argue an insanity plea.365 Moreover, Bryan himself 
explicitly did not want his counsel to present evidence portraying him as 
mentally ill.366 Finally, Bryan told counsel that he would not accept a guilty 
plea, even if doing so meant avoiding the death sentence.367 For all of these 
reasons, the court determined that counsel utilized sound strategy during the 
guilt phase.368 
Regarding Bryan’s penalty-phase Strickland claims, the court similarly 
held that counsel’s decision to omit evidence of organic brain dysfunction 
and mental impairment for mitigation purposes was a reasonable trial strat-
egy.369 Counsel explained that introducing such evidence on Bryan’s behalf 
would have done “more harm than good.”370 Specifically, counsel believed 
that testimony by either of Bryan’s medical experts “might play into the 
prosecution’s case that Bryan was a continuing threat to society.”371 
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The dissent’s response to the majority’s argument, however, emphati-
cally rejected the double-edged-sword argument: “Mr. Bryan’s counsel pro-
vided the most ineffective defense I have ever seen . . . . [His] reasoning is 
untenable.”372 Unlike the majority, the dissent found counsel’s decision to 
omit the available mental health mitigation completely non-strategic,373 par-
ticularly counsel’s fear “that the mental health testimony might be viewed 
to support future dangerousness.”374 The dissent first reviewed the vast 
amount of mitigation evidence available to Bryan’s trial counsel based on 
extensive testing, especially stressing the SPECT scan results showing Bry-
an’s extensive brain damage.375 In the dissent’s view, this evidence also 
strengthened expert testimony that Bryan was “crazy” and suffered from 
“paranoid,” “grandiose,” and “persecutory” thinking.376 
The dissent then contended that despite trial counsel’s “purported fa-
miliarity” with Bryan’s medical history, counsel seemingly believed “the 
better tack was to pretend Mr. Bryan was a perfectly normal defendant who 
was in a bad spot,” rather than present the evidence in mitigation.377 Ques-
tioning counsel’s concern that, because Bryan could apparently form intent, 
“any testimony regarding his mental distress would indicate that Mr. Bryan 
was a danger to society,”378 the dissent concluded that counsel failed to 
comprehend that psychiatric evidence (as well as SPECT scan evidence) 
could both mitigate and dissipate the strength of aggravating factors.379 
Moreover, the majority failed to consider that a defendant can be com-
petent to stand trial yet still demonstrate mental health disorders that a judge 
and jury should be able to assess.380 In the context of these arguments, the 
dissent thoroughly analyzed and critiqued the potential for neuroscience 
evidence to be viewed as a double-edged sword.381 The dissent noted that 
the majority defended counsel’s decision to omit the available mental health 
evidence as mitigation because “[g]iven the other evidence of violent be-
havior, the jury could have thought this type of psychological problem indi-
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cated a propensity for future violence.”382 Yet the dissent found it far more 
important for the jury to hear all the critical evidence about Bryan’s history 
of mental disorders, organic disease, and treatment, as well as a previous 
conviction for which he was initially found to be incompetent.383 
Had the jury been presented with a full set of evidence, the dissent be-
lieved that there was a reasonable probability that Bryan would not have 
received the death penalty because the jury had the option of sentencing 
Bryan to life without parole.384 In essence, counsel’s tactics left the jury 
devoid of any argument that Bryan may not be sufficiently culpable for the 
death penalty despite Bryan’s brain abnormalities.385 Thus, in the dissent’s 
eyes, counsel’s assistance at trial was constitutionally ineffective under 
Strickland.386 
3. The Special Case of Mental Retardation 
In Maldonado,387 Maldonado was convicted of capital murder and sen-
tenced to death.388 His death sentence was affirmed on appeal, and after the 
State dismissed his petition for habeas relief, Maldonado filed for federal 
habeas relief.389 Maldonado contended first that his mental retardation pre-
cluded his execution, and second, that his counsel provided ineffective as-
sistance by neglecting to investigate his mental retardation and additional 
mitigating evidence.390 The court ultimately denied Maldonado’s petition 
and granted summary judgment for the State.391 
According to Maldonado, his trial counsel’s failure to investigate and 
present information concerning his mental retardation392 was a critical 
omission because such evidence would have diminished the impact of his 
confession in the guilt phase and also provided strong mitigation in the pen-
alty phase.393 Due to major debates at trial among medical experts regarding 
Maldonado’s intellectual abilities, however, the court found that Maldonado 
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was not sufficiently “subaverage”394 and therefore had not demonstrated his 
counsel’s ineffectiveness.395 
Next, Maldonado argued that trial counsel performed deficiently and 
prejudicially in declining to present his mental retardation as a mitigating fac-
tor against his death sentence.396 The court, in reviewing this claim, noted the 
potential threat of future dangerousness and the challenges attorneys confront 
when considering whether to introduce mental retardation in the penalty 
phase.397 In Atkins,398 for example, the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged 
that a jury could view mental retardation as both a mitigating factor and an 
aggravating factor predictive of a defendant’s future dangerousness.399 More-
over, the Fifth Circuit had similarly embraced this double-edged-sword con-
cept, holding that a trial attorney’s decision to omit mental retardation evi-
dence can be reasonable as a means to preclude a jury’s finding of future dan-
gerousness.400 Thus, once again, the Maldonado court determined that coun-
sel was not ineffective under Strickland.401 
Regarding the pertinent issue of future dangerousness, the court would 
have weighed the aggravating factor of Maldonado’s “violent and lawless 
history” against the potentially mitigating evidence of his alleged mental 
retardation had trial counsel presented such evidence.402 As the court ex-
plained, this comparison would not have helped Maldonado: “[w]hile low 
intelligence may have allowed the jury to find that Maldonado was (as sug-
gested by the facts of the murder) a follower, that evidence also could have 
shown him to be a future danger when again encouraged by others to be 
violent.”403 The court emphasized in particular the various ways such evi-
dence could be viewed for good or for ill: “[t]he double-edged nature of the 
mitigating evidence would make it not reasonably probable that the jury 
would answer the special issues differently had trial counsel emphasized 
low intelligence in the punishment phase.”404  
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Ultimately the court held that Maldonado’s claim did not have suffi-
cient merit.405 While the double-edged-sword concept can appear compel-
ling in theory, such a balance becomes challenging in practice, particularly 
when so many other factors pertaining to cognitive deficiency are consid-
ered clearly mitigating.406 As the next case shows, the double-edged-sword 
analogy has additional interpretations beyond those discussed so far. 
4. The Two Sides of Cognitive Deficiency 
In People v. Peeples,407 defendant-petitioner sought post-conviction re-
lief after the appellate court affirmed his convictions, including first-degree 
murder.408 On a post-conviction appeal, Peeples alleged for the second time 
that his counsel was ineffective for neglecting to research and present miti-
gating evidence pertaining to Peeples’s disturbing family circumstances, his 
cognitive deficiencies, and his possible neurological disorders.409 
The lower circuit court rejected Peeples’s argument, emphasizing in 
particular that not only was such evidence a double-edged sword, it also 
leaned in favor of future dangerousness.410 Specifically, the court held that 
the “additional mitigation evidence regarding defendant’s family back-
ground and psychological condition ‘would tend to show the court that [de-
fendant] is, in fact, dangerous,’ as well as ‘his capacity for future con-
duct.’”411 Such evidence, therefore, would not necessarily be viewed as mit-
igating.412 
The opinion also noted that Peeples’s attorneys did make some effort 
to gather and present mitigation evidence, as demonstrated by their request 
for a continuance between the guilt phase and penalty phase.413 In particu-
lar, counsel discovered that Peeples had been injured in a car accident sev-
eral years prior to the case and had suffered spinal meningitis in his youth, 
both of which “may have affected [Peeples’s] brain.”414 Moreover, counsel 
demonstrated sound trial strategy in utilizing their witnesses to account for 
Peeples’s social background at the mitigation stage, thereby blunting the 
effect of Peeples’s potential for future danger.415 As the court stated, “[t]he 
record shows that defense counsel made a strategic choice to argue that 
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there were ‘two William Peeples. The William Peeples that family and 
friends knew and the William Peeples that the jury convicted of murder.’”416 
In addition, counsel had, while presenting mitigation, emphasized Peeples’s 
positive characteristics and requested that the judge regard Peeples as 
someone whose life had value and who deserved forgiveness.417 
Ultimately, the court concluded that Peeples sufficiently demonstrated 
under Strickland prong 1 that trial counsel was constitutionally deficient for 
failing to investigate and present the mitigating evidence of Peeples’s cogni-
tive deficiency.418 The court also found, however, that counsel’s deficiency 
did not prejudice Peeples under Strickland prong 2, so Peeples’s claim 
failed.419 
In an attempt to explain its denial of prong 2, the court cited its own 
precedent regarding future dangerousness and the double-edged nature of 
certain mental health mitigation evidence.420 Essentially, the precedent holds 
that when a jury considers evidence of mental dysfunction, the jury may 
find such evidence mitigating or aggravating “depending, of course, on 
whether the individual hearing the evidence finds that it evokes compassion 
or demonstrates possible future dangerousness.”421 In rejecting Peeples’s 
claim that the evidence of mental impairment would have been mitigating, 
the court reasoned that one of the expert witness’s reports “may have been 
harmful” to Peeples’s arguments because it stated that Peeples’s academic 
achievement was at the high school level.422 Further, Peeples’s “‘recollec-
tion of past events tend[ed] to ‘normalize’ his experience’” because Peeples 
“‘minimized or denied’” so many of his life’s problems.423 Without provid-
ing any scientific justification for its conclusion, the court weighed all these 
factors negatively; that is, in the court’s view, had the jury heard such evi-
dence about Peeples’s mental impairments, in addition to Peeples’s history 
of violent behavior, “the sentencer could have reasonably concluded that 
this evidence demonstrated [Peeples’s] future dangerousness.”424 
The court also rejected Peeples’s Strickland claim regarding his dis-
turbing family background, which Peeples contended should have been pre-
sented in mitigation, because the court believed the information contained 
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“powerful evidence of defendant’s future dangerousness.”425 For example, 
“the evidence reveals that, throughout his life, defendant had a quick and 
violent temper, and that this violence animated his relationships with his 
family, friends, and, most especially, with women.”426 For all these reasons, 
the court determined that what Peeples viewed as mitigation could have just 
as easily, and perhaps even more likely, been viewed as aggravating evi-
dence by a reasonable jury.427 Therefore, trial counsel’s failure to produce 
such evidence, even if constitutionally deficient, did not prejudice Peeples 
under Strickland.428 
Similar to the other future dangerousness cases, however, the court 
provided no documentation or support for its conclusions beyond simple 
speculation or, in some instances, remote prior precedent. All of the evi-
dence that Peeples deemed relevant for mitigation was, by contrast, consid-
ered critical by the courts discussed in Part II’s Strickland claim cases. 
5. The Role of Psychiatric Experts 
In Smith v. Workman,429 Smith was convicted of first degree murder 
and sentenced to death.430 Smith’s first petition for habeas relief was denied 
in state court, and he subsequently appealed to the court under review here 
for habeas relief.431 
Smith first argued that his counsel was ineffective for failing to request 
an Ake expert at the mitigation stage.432 In 1985, in Ake v. Oklahoma,433 the 
U.S. Supreme Court held that “when a defendant demonstrates to the trial 
judge that his sanity at the time of the offense is to be a significant factor at 
trial, the State must, at a minimum, assure the defendant access to a compe-
tent psychiatrist.”434 With respect to the mitigation stage of the trial, the 
Court determined that the State is obligated to provide a defendant a psy-
chiatric expert “when the State presents psychiatric evidence of the defend-
ant’s future dangerousness.”435 According to Smith, Ake applies “when any 
evidence of future dangerousness is introduced,” not just psychiatric evi-
dence.436 Therefore, in Smith’s view, his counsel was ineffective for not 
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requesting an Ake expert despite the State’s decision to exclude psychiatric 
evidence of Smith’s future dangerousness.437 
The court found that Smith’s argument was correct on the merits be-
cause the State did present evidence of future dangerousness as an aggravat-
ing factor.438 Smith’s claim failed, however, because of its timing.439 As the 
court noted, Smith’s case was tried and his sentence was handed down dur-
ing a period when the courts in Oklahoma interpreted Ake very narrowly; 
specifically, Ake was applied only when the State introduced expert psychi-
atric evidence to demonstrate future dangerousness.440 Thus, counsel’s fail-
ure to call an Ake expert when Smith’s trial took place did not adequately 
support a Strickland claim even though, had the failure occurred at the time 
of the Tenth Circuit appeal, it would have.441 
Smith also asserted that counsel failed to adequately investigate and 
present readily available mitigation evidence—specifically, “evidence of 
deprivation, neglect, physical abuse, psychological problems, addiction, and 
brain damage.”442 The court accepted, however, counsel’s contention that 
omitting certain kinds of evidence about Smith was a reasonable strategic 
decision because such information “might actually enhance rather than mit-
igate the State’s argument that [Smith] presented a continuing threat.”443 In 
addition to detailing counsel’s investigation and presentation of mitigation 
at trial, the court also emphasized that counsel was “understandably reluc-
tant” to present specific mitigation witnesses and evidence.444 In particular, 
counsel testified that he did not want mitigation witnesses to “open the 
door” to Smith’s “lifetime propensity for fighting,” which would have sup-
ported an aggravating factor of future dangerousness.445 The court conclud-
ed that despite the evidence that could have been introduced, such as child-
hood abuse, “addiction problems, psychological problems, brain injury and 
borderline intelligence,” Smith’s counsel did not perform unreasonably un-
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der the circumstances.446 Therefore, the court affirmed Smith’s death sen-
tence.447 
Smith is an unusual case because it is based, in part, on the interpreta-
tion of legal decisions that have since been expanded to broaden the scope 
of Ake.448 In addition, Ake is an important Supreme Court decision that pro-
vides some protection for defendants involved in future dangerousness cas-
es. That said, like the other cases in this Section, the evidence at issue in 
Smith could just as easily be regarded as mitigating. 
Overall, then, this Part discussed the future dangerousness cases focus-
ing on the contradictions presented by the double-edged-sword concept. On 
the one hand, courts urge attorneys to fully investigate and present mitigat-
ing evidence such as neuroscience; they discipline those who fail to do so 
under appropriate circumstances, especially when defendants face a death 
sentence. On the other hand, in a limited number of cases, courts also accept 
arguments that neuroscience evidence can be indicative of a defendant’s 
future dangerousness. The justifications for future dangerousness arguments 
are complex and varied, but they should not be ignored. Neuroscience evi-
dence overwhelmingly occupies the halls of mitigation—hence the myth of 
the double-edged sword—but danger can lie at the ends of those halls and 
attorneys should be prepared for it. 
CONCLUSION 
In recent years, the increasing acceptance of neuroscience evidence in 
the criminal justice system has spurred controversy, raising questions about 
how such evidence is applied. This Article tackles those questions by ana-
lyzing my unprecedented empirical Study of the 800 criminal cases that 
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addressed neuroscience evidence over the course of two decades (1992–
2012). The Study’s results suggest that not only is much of the controversy 
concerning the role of neuroscience unwarranted, but also that the use of 
such evidence has been misunderstood. Neuroscience is often viewed as a 
“double-edged sword,” capable both of lessening and enhancing a defend-
ant’s blameworthiness; yet, that view fuels myths that neuroscience will 
either justify the freeing of violent criminals or bolster unjust predictions 
regarding defendants’ future dangerousness. 
My Study reveals a criminal justice system that accepts both the 
strengths and limitations of neuroscience evidence in ways that discredit the 
myth of the double-edged sword. For example, results show that neurosci-
ence evidence is usually offered to mitigate punishments in the way that 
traditional criminal law has always allowed, and to provide fact-finders 
with more complete, reliable, and precise information when determining a 
defendant’s fate. Likewise, the Study uncovers a criminal justice system 
that is willing to accept modern methods of assessing defendants’ mental 
capabilities, and expects its attorneys to do the same. Indeed one of the 
Study’s most striking findings concerns the parameters of ineffective assis-
tance of counsel claims: courts not only expect attorneys to investigate and 
use available neuroscience evidence in their cases when it is appropriate, 
but they penalize attorneys who neglect this obligation. 
This Article further examines one of the most widely held myths about 
the double-edged sword—that prosecutors will use neuroscience evidence 
to fuel arguments that a defendant is a future danger and therefore deserves 
death or extensive incarceration. To the contrary, however, my Study found 
that neuroscience evidence is only rarely used to bolster a defendant’s fu-
ture dangerousness and that prosecutors employ a variety of purported strat-
egies in making such arguments. Indeed, as courts continue to support neu-
roscience tools and raise new questions, my Study’s empirical data will 
provide a foundation for discussions regarding the use of neuroscience evi-
dence in criminal cases. The findings presented in this Article will also en-
sure that those discussions are grounded in fact rather than hyperbole. 
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